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INTRODUCTION
Discussions of antitrust and the Constitution generally focus on
how the latter informs or controls the former. This is not surprising;
antitrust regulation is a creature of statute,1 and a vague statute
susceptible to flexible interpretations. Moreover, the Constitution
is the paramount law, and statutory regimes must yield to it and
not the other way around.2 No court ever says: we are construing the
relevant constitutional provision so as to be consistent with the
statute before us. So it should be no surprise that scholars have
identified various ways in which constitutional doctrines or con-
siderations have influenced and informed the ever-evolving ju-
risprudence that implements the Sherman Act’s unchanged text.
The Court’s jurisprudence regarding the reach of the Sherman
Act vis-à-vis local conduct exemplifies such one-sided interaction
between Constitution and statute. Initially, and famously, the Court
read the Act in light of the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents,
holding that the Act did not reach a merger to monopoly because
such intrastate activity only impacted interstate commerce “in-
directly.”3 The Court continued to invoke and apply the “direct/
indirect” formula in the Sherman Act context into the mid-1930s.4
Of course, the Court adjusted its Commerce Clause jurisprudence
during the New Deal, vastly expanding the scope of congressional
power vis-à-vis purely local conduct. Most notably, in Wickard v.
Filburn, the Court held that Congress could reach any conduct that
produced “a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce,”5
even if that effect was indirect within the meaning of prior Com-
merce Clause caselaw. Just six years later, and almost as if on cue,
the Court imported the substantial effects test from Wickard into its
antitrust federalism jurisprudence.6 In so doing, the Court repudi-
ated five decades of contrary precedent, despite the absence of any
statutory change. Since that time, the Court has repeatedly applied
1. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
3. See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1895).
4. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 365 (1933).
5. 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
6. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229 (1948).
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the Act to local conduct producing purely intrastate harms, so long
as such conduct produced the requisite substantial effect.7 In some
such cases the Court invoked Wickard in support of this approach.8
The Court also claimed that developments in the nation’s economy
justified the vast expansion of the commerce power—and the cor-
relative expansion of the scope of the Sherman Act.9
This Article offers what one might call an alternative history of
the relationship between Wickard v. Filburn and the Sherman Act.
Thus, the Article “flips the script” and asks what would have hap-
pened if Wickard had looked to Sherman Act precedents for guid-
ance and not vice-versa. While counter-intuitive at first, such an
inquiry sheds important and surprising light upon the massive con-
stitutional (and, under the Sherman Act, statutory) change that
Wickard wrought. In particular, the Court’s pre-Wickard experience
with application of the direct/indirect test in the antitrust context
contradicts and/or undermines several assumptions that pur-
portedly drove Wickard’s decision to repudiate the direct/indirect
standard and replace it with the far more generous (to Congress)
substantial effects test. Moreover, and ironically, a thorough un-
derstanding of the Court’s pre-New Deal antitrust federalism de-
cisions helps generate a more enduring and plausible rationale for
the result in Wickard, a rationale that does no violence to the
constitutional order that Wickard inherited.
Part I of this Article recounts the Supreme Court’s own account
of the relationship between Wickard and the Sherman Act. Part II
describes the scope of the commerce power before Wickard, particu-
larly the direct/indirect test that was in place when Congress pas-
sed the Sherman Act and which the Court employed to evaluate
whether the commerce power reached purely local conduct. Part III
describes the Court’s pre-Wickard approach to the reach of the
Sherman Act, which, as will be seen, was a straightforward ap-
plication of the Court’s pre-1890, indeed pre-New Deal, Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Part IV describes Wickard and, in particular,
the Court’s rationale for repudiating five decades of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence in favor of the substantial effects test. This
7. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980).
8. See e.g., id.
9. Id.
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Part also explains how, in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Amer-
ican Crystal Sugar Co., the Court embraced both Wickard’s sub-
stantial effects test under the aegis of the Sherman Act as well as
Wickard’s rationale for repudiating the longstanding direct/indirect
test in the first place.10 Part V flips the script and examines what
the Wickard Court could have learned from the antitrust jurispru-
dence that Mandeville Island Farms repudiated. Part VI explains
how the pre-Wickard antitrust decisions provide a more defensible
foundation for the result in Wickard, if not its rationale.
I. WICKARD AND THE SHERMAN ACT: THE DOMINANT JUDICIAL
NARRATIVE
The dominant narrative within the courts regarding the interac-
tion between Wickard and the Sherman Act goes something like
this: when Congress passed the Sherman Act, it sought to exercise
the full extent of its commerce power, using the language of the
Commerce Clause to describe the reach of the Act.11 However, in
several early decisions, particularly United States v. E. C. Knight
Co.,12 the Court thwarted Congress’s intent.13 That is, the Court
10. See generally 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
11. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.”
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328 n.7 (1991)
(concluding that in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress intended to “g[o] as far as the Con-
stitution permits Congress to go” (alteration in original) (quoting 20 CONG. REC. 1167 (1889)));
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) (“[W]ith reference to
commercial trade restraints such as these, Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, left no area
of its constitutional power unoccupied; it ‘exercised all the power it possessed.’” (quoting Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940))). Ironically, the Court first announced this
nostrum in 1932, when it still imposed very meaningful constraints on the scope of the Act,
in a case involving the reach of the Act vis-à-vis conduct in the District of Columbia. See Atl.
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932); see also infra notes 177-78
and accompanying text (describing limits on the scope of the Act in 1932).
12. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
13. See Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 230 (“The Knight decision made the statute
a dead letter for more than a decade and, had its full force remained unmodified, the Act
today would be a weak instrument, as would also the power of Congress, to reach evils in all
the vast operations of our gigantic national industrial system antecedent to interstate sale
and transportation of manufactured products.”); id. at 229 (asserting that E. C. Knight
“applied ... mechanical distinctions with substantially nullifying effects for coverage both of
the [Commerce] power and of the Act”); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121-22, 122 n.20
(1942) (stating that in initial Sherman Act decisions, “the Court adhered to its earlier
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erred by reading the Act in light of the division of authority between
state and federal sovereigns described in the Court’s pre-1890
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.14 The cases creating this jurispru-
dence arose in the context of claims by regulated parties that state
laws were invalid because they in fact regulated interstate com-
merce.15 Thus, it is said, such decisions announced unduly narrow
accounts of the reach of federal power, so as to avoid claims that
states were exercising authority exclusively delegated to Congress,
and thereby validate state authority over essentially intrastate
activity.16 E. C. Knight, it is said, improperly treated these prece-
dents as demarking the boundaries of affirmative federal power
that Congress sought to exercise by statute via the Sherman Act.17
To be sure, subsequent decisions backtracked some from E. C.
Knight’s categorical holding that the Act could never reach manufac-
turing (and by implication agriculture and mining).18 However,
despite continuing integration of the national economy and the
growing role of truly national enterprises, and despite decisions
outside the antitrust context—most notably The Shreveport Rate
Case—that purportedly read the commerce power more gener-
ously,19 the Court continued to invoke the pre-1890 mechanical
pronouncements, and allowed but little scope to the power of Congress”).
14. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 24 (1888) (holding that states possess exclusive
authority over manufacturing).
15. See id. at 22-23.
16. See United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 542-45 (1944) (finding
that numerous decisions holding that insurance was not interstate commerce were poor
“guides to determining Congressional power under the Commerce Clause”); Wickard, 317 U.S.
at 121 (asserting that nearly all pre-1942 decisions announcing narrow conceptions of federal
power arose in the context of challenges to state laws); id. (“For nearly a century, however,
decisions of this Court under the Commerce Clause dealt rarely with questions of what
Congress might do in the exercise of its granted power under the Clause, and almost entirely
with the permissibility of state activity which it was claimed discriminated against or
burdened interstate commerce. During this period ... the influence of the Clause on American
life and law was a negative one, resulting almost wholly from its operation as a restraint upon
the powers of the states. In discussion and decision the point of reference, instead of being
what was ‘necessary and proper’ to the exercise by Congress of its granted power, was often
some concept of sovereignty thought to be implicit in the status of statehood.”).
17. See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121-22.
18. See Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 231-32 (recognizing that Standard Oil Co.
of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106
(1911) recognized a broader reach for the Act than E. C. Knight).
19. See id. at 231-34 (invoking The Shreveport Rate Case doctrine as exemplar of “a great
turning point in the construction of the commerce clause” but noting that “the transition ...
1340 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1335
direct/indirect test when determining whether the Act reached a
challenged restraint.20 As a result, the pre-New Deal Court repeat-
edly held that the Act did not reach various forms of anticompetitive
conduct that, while local, nonetheless affected interstate commerce,
and thus should have fallen within the scope of Congress’s com-
merce power as properly understood in The Shreveport Rate Case
and similar decisions.21
Fortunately, the story goes, other developments in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence finally caught up with antitrust’s unduly
narrow approach to the Sherman Act. This is where Wickard enters
the story. Wickard, of course, was not an antitrust case.22 But it did
involve economic regulation of output as part of an effort to raise
prices.23 Moreover, the regulated party in the case invoked the
direct/indirect standard, contending that, at most, his activities
had only an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce.24 A dissenting
was neither smooth nor immediately complete, particularly for applying the Sherman Act....
[because] [t]he old ideas persisted in specific applications as late as the 1930’s”); see also
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123-24 (invoking similar account of the role of The Shreveport Rate
Case); Hous. E. & W. Tex. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) [hereinafter The
Shreveport Rate Case].
20. See Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 229 (asserting that “the first decision under
the Sherman Act [E. C. Knight] applied those mechanical distinctions” between production
and manufacturing, on the one hand, and commerce on the other); id. (contending that
defendants’ argument rested upon “[t]he artificial and mechanical separation of ‘production’
and ‘manufacturing’ from ‘commerce,’ without regard to their economic continuity”); Wickard,
317 U.S. at 124 (characterizing the direct/indirect test as requiring “the mechanical
application of legal formulas”); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 509 (1940)
(characterizing the direct/indirect test as entailing a “mechanical ... application of these
cryptic phrases”).
21. See Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 228-38; S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S.
at 543-47.
22. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115-16.
23. See id.
24. See Brief for Appellee at 11, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (No. 59) (“It is
also clear that where federal control is sought to be exercised over activities which separately
considered are intrastate, it must appear that there is a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce in order to justify the federal intervention for its protection. However
difficult in application, this principle is essential to the maintenance of our Constitutional
system. The subject of federal power is still ‘commerce,’ and not all commerce but commerce
with foreign nations and among the several States. The expansion of enterprise has vastly
increased the interests of interstate commerce but the constitutional differentiation still
obtains. ‘Activities local in their immediacy do not become interstate and national because of
distant repercussions.’ To express this essential distinction, ‘direct’ has been contrasted with
‘indirect,’ and what is ‘remote’ or ‘distant’ with what is ‘close’ and ‘substantial.’” (quoting
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judge in the lower court, invoking the same standard, disagreed,
contending that, when combined with similar activities by other
regulated parties, the plaintiff’s activities in fact directly impacted
interstate commerce.25
Wickard did not resolve this disagreement between the regulat-
ed party and the dissent below. Instead, the Court took the opportu-
nity to jettison the direct/indirect test altogether as a “mechanical”
exercise that obscured focus on the real question—namely, whether
the activity that Congress sought to regulate “exerts a substantial
economic effect upon interstate commerce.”26 This question was ask-
ed and answered “irrespective of whether such effect is what might
at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’”27
While the plaintiff’s own activities did not exert such an effect, the
Court said similar activities, when aggregated with one another, did
have a substantial effect, bringing the plaintiff’s activities within
Congress’s authority.28 This approach, the Court said, implemented
the breathtaking scope of the commerce power recognized in Gib-
bons v. Ogden29 and never surpassed since.30
By illustrating the putative shortcomings of the direct/indi-
rect test more generally, Wickard paved the way for banishing the
putative test from antitrust jurisprudence as well. Just six years af-
ter Wickard, the Court unanimously jettisoned fifty years of Sher-
man Act precedent, invoking Wickard several times and opining
that the direct/indirect test was a “mechanical” and “artificial” relic
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 466-67 (1938) (Hughes, C.J.) (Internal
citations omitted)).
25. See Filburn v. Helke, 43 F. Supp. 1017, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1942) (Allen, J., dissenting)
(“It is true that Congress has no power to regulate intrastate transactions which affect
commerce only indirectly. But where it is claimed that the local activity sought to be regulated
does not directly affect commerce, decision should not be made by examination of the effect
of isolated individual activity, but must include due regard to the total effect of the attempted
regulation.” (citations omitted)).
26. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124-25.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 127-28 (“That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as
here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial.”).
29. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
30. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120 (“At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the
federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded.” (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 194-95)).
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of a preindustrial age.31 Modern economic conditions, as Wickard
taught, required the Sherman Act to reach any conduct that
produced a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce, regardless
of whether that effect was direct or indirect.32 The reach of the
Sherman Act was once again yoked to the scope of the commerce
power.
The Court has repeatedly applied this test in subsequent cases,
and the Act now reaches purely local restraints that produce no
interstate harm, direct or indirect, with the result that the Act
reaches just about all commercial conduct.33 But this vast reach,
the story continued, simply implemented Congress’s desire to
exercise the complete scope of its commerce power, including any
post-Sherman Act expansion of the commerce power, vis-à-vis
anticompetitive conduct.34 Moreover, wide-ranging changes in the
31. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229 (1948).
32. See id. at 234 (“[T]he vital question becomes whether the effect is sufficiently
substantial and adverse to Congress’ paramount policy declared in the Act’s terms to
constitute a forbidden consequence.”).
33. See Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1991) (holding that the
Sherman Act reached group boycott by physicians in a single hospital directed against a sin-
gle physician who practiced in a single department); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Or-
leans, 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (holding that the Sherman Act reached horizontal price fixing
agreement between realtors in single city); id. at 241 (“The broad authority of Congress under
the Commerce Clause has, of course, long been interpreted to extend beyond activities ac-
tually in interstate commerce to reach other activities that, while wholly local in nature,
nevertheless substantially affect interstate commerce.” (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942))); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740-41 (1976) (holding that
the Sherman Act reached conduct designed to thwart expansion of a single hospital in a single
city because the hospital planning to expand purchased some inputs from out-of-state firms);
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784-85 (1975) (holding that the Sherman Act reached
conspiracy between a single county’s lawyers to fix fees for title searches within the county
because some purchasers obtained financing from lenders in other states); Burke v. Ford, 389
U.S. 320, 321-22 (1967) (per curiam) (holding that the Sherman Act reached horizontal
agreements between a single state’s liquor wholesalers to divide markets for retail sales
simply because wholesalers purchased liquor from suppliers in other states); see also HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 1012 (5th ed. 2016) (explaining that under Wick-
ard’s substantial effects test, the Sherman Act has “reached almost any market or transaction
with more than a trivial impact on interstate commerce”).
34. See Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 328 n.7 (concluding that Congress intended to “g[o]
as far as the Constitution permits Congress to go” (alteration in original) (quoting 20 CONG.
REC. 1167 (1889))); United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944)
(“Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust
and monopoly agreements.”); see also Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 329 n.8 (“The Court’s de-
cisions have long ‘permitted the reach of the Sherman Act to expand along with expanding
notions of congressional power.’” (quoting Hosp. Bldg. Co., 425 U.S. at 743 n.2)).
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nation’s economy had altered the relationships between local
activities and interstate commerce, thereby justifying federal con-
trol of activities previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
states.35 At the same time, the Court has not embraced the aggre-
gation test, instead requiring plaintiffs to establish that the chal-
lenged restraint itself has the requisite impact upon interstate
commerce.36
It should be no surprise that jurisprudence regarding the scope of
the Sherman Act would reflect the influence of developments in
Commerce Clause doctrine. Legal doctrines, particularly those that
address similar or overlapping subject matters, are sometimes sym-
biotic, reflecting mutual influence upon each other and/or common
background influences. For instance, experience applying a par-
ticular standard in one doctrinal context can help inform or in-
fluence the application of a similar standard in a different context.
Moreover, exogenous changes in the nation’s economic circum-
stances or institutions could induce adjustments in two or more
doctrinal contexts, to the extent distinct doctrinal categories share
common normative premises and thus respond in similar ways to
particular factual changes. Thus, Barry Cushman has persuasively
argued that the Court developed and applied similar conceptual
categories to implement both its Commerce Clause and Due Pro-
cess jurisprudence, with developments in one doctrinal category
35. See, e.g., Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 328-29 (“[A]s the dimensions and complexity of
our economy have grown, the federal power over commerce, and the concomitant coverage of
the Sherman Act, have experienced similar expansion.”); McLain, 444 U.S. at 241 (“During
the near century of Sherman Act experience, forms and modes of business and commerce have
changed along with changes in communication and travel, and innovations in methods of
conducting particular businesses have altered relationships in commerce. Application of the
Act reflects an adaptation to these changing circumstances.”(emphasis added)).
36. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95, 197 n.12 (1974)
(explaining that the language of the Sherman Act implies an individual judicial assessment
of the impact of challenged restraints on interstate commerce and thus does not define a
class of activities susceptible to application of the aggregation test). Mandeville Island Farms
is an exception, having embraced Wickard for both the substantial effects test and, in a
sentence, for the aggregation test. See Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 236 (“[I]t is
enough that the individual activity when multiplied into a general practice is subject to
federal control.”). However, subsequent decisions cited Wickard or Mandeville Island Farms
only for the substantial effects test. See, e.g., McLain, 444 U.S. at 241; Hosp. Bldg. Co., 425
U.S. at 743; Burke, 389 U.S. at 321 (per curiam); United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass’n
of Chi., 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954).
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influencing those in the other and vice versa.37 I subsequently
explained how the Supreme Court drew upon its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to define the category of activities subject to the
Sherman Act and exclusive state regulation.38 Changed circum-
stances could thus, one might think, exert a common influence upon
both doctrinal categories. But of course, dialogue is a two way street.
If Sherman Act doctrine can learn from Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, then perhaps Sherman Act doctrine can teach the Commerce
Clause a thing or two. Indeed, a little reflection will show that the
Wickard Court missed a golden opportunity to draw upon the wis-
dom and experience of Sherman Act jurisprudence, which the Court
all but ignored before reformulating Commerce Clause doctrine. A
Court better attuned to the large body of caselaw applying the di-
rect/indirect test to implement the Sherman Act would have found
no need to jettison the test in favor of the broader substantial effects
test.
II. THE COMMERCE POWER BEFORE WICKARD
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to “regulate com-
merce ... among the several States.”39 Wickard invoked Gibbons v.
Ogden as the foundational and definitive exposition of the scope and
content of the commerce power.40 Gibbons unanimously defined
commerce in largely transactional terms, to include “the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branch-
es.”41 Such intercourse included “navigation,” as well as “traffic,”
“buying and selling,” and “the interchange of commodities.”42
37. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 143-48 (1998).
38. See Alan J. Meese, Competition Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and
a New Way Forward, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 255, 270-75 (2013); id. at 271, n. 71; see
also Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 90 (1999)
(explaining how courts defined restraints as “direct” if they produced the same sort of harm
that rendered restraints subject to regulation under the police power).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
40. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (“At the beginning Chief Justice
Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded.” (citing
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat.) (1824))).
41. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90.
42. Id. at 189.
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Gibbons also rejected claims that “among” meant “within,”
thereby rejecting claims that Congress had the authority to regulate
commerce confined to a single state.43 “The genius and character of
the whole government,” as well as the language of the clause, the
Court said, compelled the conclusion that “among” was instead
synonymous with “between,” thereby leaving intrastate activity
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.44 More precisely,
these two considerations established that Congress could regulate
“all the external concerns of the nation,” as well as “those internal
concerns which affect the States generally,” but could not govern
“those [concerns] which are completely within a particular State,
[and] which do not affect other States.”45 Congressional authority
over intrastate commerce, the Court said, would be “inconvenient,”
and was “certainly unnecessary.”46 Thus, “[t]he completely internal
commerce of a State,” such as that “carried on between man and
man in a State ... may be considered as reserved for the State
itself.”47
Having defined “commerce” and “among the several States,” the
Court defined “regulate,” as the authority to “prescribe the rule by
which commerce is to be governed.”48 Throughout the nineteenth
century and into the twentieth, courts treated Gibbons’s definitions
of “commerce,” “among,” and “regulate” as definitive expositions of
the language of the Clause.49
Gibbons also suggested that the federal commerce power was
exclusive within portions of its domain and thus would, even ab-
sent congressional legislation, invalidate state obstructions to in-
terstate commerce, insofar as such state-imposed obstructions
would constitute state “regulation” of a subject exclusively allocated
43. See id. at 194-95.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 195.
46. Id. at 194.
47. Id. at 194-95
48. Id. at 190-91, 194, 196.
49. See, e.g., The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (invoking Gibbons’s
definition of “regulate” and the rationale governing the division of authority between states
and the national government); The Emp’rs Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 492-93 (1908) (invoking
Gibbons’s definition of “regulate” to account for the division between State and Federal
authority); County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 696-97 (1880) (invoking Gibbons’s
definition of interstate commerce).
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to Congress.50 The Court officially implemented this dicta in 1851,
in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, constructing a doctrine of implied
preemption invalidating most state regulations of interstate com-
merce, even absent any congressional action.51 In particular, the
Court divided state regulations of interstate commerce into two
categories, depending upon the “subject” of the regulation.52 Some
subjects were “national in their character” and/or demanded a
uniform system of national regulation.53 Others, while involving or
connected to interstate commerce, were nonetheless “local, or ...
mere aids to commerce” and best suited to decentralized regulation
by individual states better attuned to the “special circumstances” of
the subject.54
Where a subject was national in its character or demanded uni-
form national regulation, the Court read congressional silence as
expressing the national legislature’s will that interstate commerce
be free from state restraints.55 Thus, the Court read congressional
50. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 199-203; see also Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1399 (2004) (describing the historical setting of Gibbons and the
distinction between the decision’s holding and dicta).
51. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 325 (1851) (explaining that the Commerce Clause ipso facto
invalidated some state regulation).
52. See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1099, 1114-15 (2000).
53. See, e.g., Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697 (“The subjects, [of Commerce Clause regulation] ...
are of infinite variety, requiring for their successful management different plans or modes of
treatment. Some of them are national in their character, and admit and require uniformity
of regulation, affecting alike all the States, others are local, or are mere aids to commerce, and
can only be properly regulated by provisions adapted to their special circumstances and
localities.”); see also Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 318-20.
54. Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697; see also Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319-320 (regulation of
harbor pilotage “imperatively demand[ed] that diversity [of opinion], which alone can meet
the local necessities of navigation”).
55. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1890) (“Whenever, however, a
particular power of the general government is one which must necessarily be exercised by it,
and Congress remains silent ... the only legitimate conclusion is that the general government
intended that power should not be affirmatively exercised, and the action of the States cannot
be permitted to effect that which would be incompatible with such intention. Hence, inasmuch
as interstate commerce, consisting in the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of
commodities, is national in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system, so long
as Congress does not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing the States so to do, it thereby
indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammelled.”); Bowman v. Chi. &
Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888) (“[S]tate legislation, however legitimate in its origin or
object, when it conflicts with the positive legislation of Congress, or its intention reasonably
implied from its silence, in respect to the subject of [interstate] commerce ... must fail.”); see
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inaction as the equivalent of federal legislation, preempting state
regulation of such subjects, and thereby ensuring uniform regula-
tion.56
By 1875, potential subjects of commerce regulation fell into three
categories: (1) commerce that was purely intrastate, beyond Con-
gress’s authority, and thus subject to exclusive state regulation; (2)
interstate commerce that required a uniform rule and/or one
national system of regulation, and thus was subject exclusively to
congressional regulation; and (3) interstate commerce subject to
concurrent state and federal regulation.57 This body of Commerce
Clause doctrine later became known as “dual federalism.”58
Implementation of dual federalism required a theory of the af-
firmative scope of the commerce power and resulting boundary
between state and federal authority. After all, state legislation could
not regulate interstate commerce and thus potentially succumb to
implied congressional preemption unless Congress had authority
over the subject in the first place.59 Because of the paucity of express
affirmative federal commercial regulation during this era, nearly
all decisions defining the affirmative scope of Congress’s authority,
and thus the boundary between state and federal power, involved
claims that state legislation ran afoul of the Commerce Clause.60
Given independent territorial restraints on state legislative au-
thority,61 all or nearly all such cases involved state legislation
governing private activity that took place entirely within a given
state, which challengers claimed nonetheless regulated subjects of
interstate commerce exclusively reserved for Congress.62 In the
also Cushman, supra note 52, at 1101-10 (collecting and discussing additional cases).
56. Cushman, supra note 52, at 1103-08.
57. See supra notes 43-46, 49-55 and accompanying text.
58. See E.S. Corwin, Standpoint in Constitutional Law, The Schechter Case, Landmark,
or What?, 13 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 151, 181 (1936) (coining term).
59. See Leisy, 135 U.S. at 109-10 (concluding that Congress’s silence with respect to in-
herently national commercial subjects evinced its intent that such commerce should remain
“free and untrammeled”).
60. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying texts.
61. See James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, The Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1509, 1516-1519 (2008) (“Every significant attribute of legislative power available to
states was territorially circumscribed [in the mid-late nineteenth century].”).
62. See Cushman, supra note 52, at 1101 (“In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the central question in constitutional federalism was not the extent to which the
Commerce Clause empowered Congress to regulate local activities. It was instead the degree
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course of adjudicating these claims, the Court held that various
intrastate activities exceeded the scope of the commerce power, that
states had exclusive authority over such activities, and that the
challenged state legislation did not regulate interstate commerce.63
These activities included intrastate ferries,64 rates for the storage
of grain shipped from numerous locations to Chicago before ship-
ment to other states,65 rates for intrastate railroad travel,66 qualifi-
cations for intrastate operation of locomotives,67 and intrastate
manufacture of alcohol intended for export to other states.68 Given
the Gibbons framework, the implication, of course, was that federal
authority over such conduct was not “necessary” and would be
“inconvenient.”69
These decisions did not depend upon any assumption that the
impact of such intrastate activities was hermetically sealed within
a state. Instead, the Court repeatedly recognized and assumed that
intrastate activity subject to exclusive state regulation would some-
times “affect[ ]” interstate commerce.70 This raised the possibility
that Congress could regulate such conduct given Gibbons’s sugges-
to which the ‘negative implications’ of that clause limited the regulatory authority of state and
local governments.”).
63. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 573-75 (1852) (holding that intrastate
navigation exceeded Congress’s authority, with the result that the Commerce Clause did not
preempt a state grant of an exclusive franchise to a steamship operator that had improved a
portion of a local river).
65. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876) (rejecting the claim that state
regulation of grain elevator rates violated the Commerce Clause because such regulation only
impacted interstate commerce indirectly).
66. See, e.g., Peik v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 94 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1876) (affirming the state’s
exclusive authority to regulate intrastate railroad rates); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 163 (1876) (“This road, like the warehouse in [Munn], is situated within
the limits of a single State. Its business is carried on there, and its regulation is a matter of
domestic concern.”).
67. See, e.g., Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 480, 482 (1888) (rejecting a Commerce
Clause challenge to state imposition of qualification for operating intrastate locomotive).
68. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 22-23, 25-26 (1888) (rejecting a Commerce
Clause challenge to state’s ban on the intrastate production of alcohol intended for interstate
shipment).
69. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824).
70. See, e.g., Kidd, 128 U.S. at 22-23 (recognizing that a ban on manufacturing reduced
interstate commerce); Smith, 124 U.S. at 482 (recognizing that intrastate locomotive
operation could impact interstate commerce); Munn, 94 U.S. at 135 (recognizing that reg-
ulation of rates for grain storage impacted interstate commerce).
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tion that Congress could regulate commercial activity that “affect-
[ed] other States.”71 Still, the Court avoided this possible implication
of Gibbons by adopting a distinction between “direct” and “indirect”
effects. So long as the impact of such activities, and the regulation
thereof, upon interstate commerce was “indirect,” such activities
remained within the exclusive authority of the states.72 Where,
however, such intrastate activity or the regulation thereof affected
interstate commerce “directly,” the legislation in question improp-
erly regulated a subject reserved to Congress and was thus pre-
empted.73 States, therefore, possessed exclusive authority over
manufacturing, mining, and agriculture, even when such activities
affected interstate commerce, because any such impact was in-
direct.74 According to one leading legal historian, “[a]ffirmative
71. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
72. See Kidd, 128 U.S. at 23 (“‘[L]egislation [by a State] may in a great variety of ways
affect commerce and persons engaged in it, without constituting a regulation of it within the
meaning of the Constitution,' unless ... it ‘imposes a direct burden upon interstate commerce,’
or ‘interferes directly with its freedom.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Hall v.
DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 487, 488 (1877))); Smith, 124 U.S. at 482 (concluding that regulation of
qualifications of a state’s locomotive engineers was not a regulation of interstate commerce
because it affected commerce “only indirectly, incidentally, and remotely, and not so as to
burden or impede [it]”); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102 (1876) (explaining that Congress
could only preempt state laws that “operated directly upon [interstate] commerce”); id. at 103
(“General legislation of this kind ... is not open to any valid objection because it may affect
persons engaged in ... inter-State commerce.”); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1876)
(sustaining the exclusion of non-Virginians from planting oysters in a state stream because
“[c]ommerce has nothing to do with land while producing, but only with the product after it
has become the subject of trade”); Munn, 94 U.S. at 135 (finding that regulation of rates for
storage of grain, some of which was destined for interstate shipment, only impacted inter-
state commerce “indirectly”); see also R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1877) (“Many acts
of a State may, indeed, affect commerce, without amounting to a regulation of it, in the
constitutional sense of the term.”); Cushman, supra note 52, at 1090.
73. See Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322 (1890) (holding that a facially neutral
state meat inspection regime was an impermissible regulation of interstate commerce be-
cause it “directly tend[ed] to restrict the slaughtering of animals, whose meat [was] to be sold
in Minnesota for human food, to those engaged in such business in that State”); Hall, 95 U.S.
at 488 (“State legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon inter-state commerce,
or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of Con-
gress.”); see also Sherlock, 93 U.S. at 102-03 (explaining that the Court would invalidate state
regulation as contrary to the Commerce Clause where “the legislation created, in the way of
tax, license, or condition, a direct burden upon commerce, or in some way directly interfered
with its freedom”).
74. See, e.g., Kidd, 128 U.S. at 20, 22-24 (distinguishing “manufactur[ing]” from
“commerce” and holding that Congress lacked power over the former because banning pro-
duction would only impact interstate commerce indirectly).
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Commerce Clause doctrine during this period, then, was the flip
side of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”75
Critics characterized the resulting jurisprudence as unduly
wooden and formalistic at best, and a form of activism designed to
narrow the reach of federal power at worst.76 A more charitable
interpretation exists, however. The Court at least viewed its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as an effort to implement the
underlying structural rationale for adopting the Commerce Clause
in the first place.77 Under the “helpless, inadequate” Articles of
Confederation, the Court said, self-interested states had adopted
various protectionist measures that burdened interstate and in-
ternational trade, thereby leaving commerce in an “oppressed and
degraded state.”78
75. Cushman, supra note 52, at 1126.
76. See id. at 1093 (reviewing various canonical scholarly treatments and concluding that
“[t]he conventional presentation [in textbooks] of the Court's Commerce Clause decisions thus
suggests that the Justices were at best jurisprudentially disoriented and at worst cynically
opportunistic”); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS
156 (1936) (“[T]he term 'indirect' in this context is a mere device, a formula pulled out of the
judicial hat.”).
77. See Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 440 (1879) (“[I]t will always be true, as a matter
of historical fact, that [the Federal Government] had its immediate origin in the necessities
of commerce; and for its immediate object ... establishing a uniform and steady system.”).
78. See id. (explaining that protectionist state legislation was invalidated, “and a national
government instituted, with full power over the entire subject of commerce, except that wholly
internal to the States”); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (“The depressed condition
of commerce and the obstacles to its growth previous to the adoption of the Constitution, from
the want of some single controlling authority, has been frequently referred to by this court.”);
State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 214 (1870) (“Prior to adoption of the
Constitution the States attempted to regulate commerce ... and it was the embarrassments
growing out of such regulations and conflicting obligations which mainly led to the
abandonment of the Confederation and to the more perfect union.”); Brown v. Maryland, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445 (1827) (“The oppressed and degraded state of commerce previous
to the adoption of the constitution can scarcely be forgotten.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (explaining that the states’ pursuit of self-
interest “began to show itself in iniquitous laws and impolitic measures, from which grew up
a conflict of commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony of the States”); 2 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1054 (Boston, Hilliard,
Gray & Co. 1833) (“The oppressed and degraded state of commerce [under the Articles of
Confederation], can scarcely be forgotten.... Those, who felt the injury arising from this state
of things, and those, who were capable of estimating the influence of commerce on the
prosperity of nations, perceived the necessity of giving the control over this important subject
to a single government.”); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper
Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 598-601 (1994) (describing
how some states imposed import taxes that exploited other states).
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The Framers and Ratifiers abandoned the Confederation, the
Court said, and instituted “a national government ... with full power
over the entire subject of [interstate] commerce.”79 Such power
prevented states from adopting legislation that advantaged their
own citizens at the expense of others.80 The Commerce Clause was
designed to ensure “a perfect equality amongst the several States as
to commercial rights, and to prevent unjust and invidious distinc-
tions, which local jealousies or local and partial interests might be
disposed to introduce and maintain.”81 As I demonstrate elsewhere
in more detail, this principle helped inform and explain the Court’s
adoption and implementation of the direct/indirect taxonomy.82 In
particular, the Court apparently treated a regulation’s impact as
“direct” if the regulation harmed consumers in other states, thereby
suggesting that the regulation in question had protectionist origins,
benefiting the state’s citizens at the expense of others.83 Only
Congress, the Court said, with its “enlarged view of the interests of
all the States,” possessed the proper incentives to regulate such
subjects, because such regulation must be “of a general and national
character, and cannot be safely and wisely remitted to local rules
and local regulations.”84 The Clause thus prevented a race to the
bottom and resulting suboptimal legislation with respect to in-
terstate commerce.85 The result was a “free-trade network,” with
the Supreme Court acting as an “umpire” invalidating protectionist
laws.86
79. Guy, 100 U.S. at 440.
80. See LeBoeuf, supra note 78, at 598-601 (describing how states imposed import taxes
to the disadvantage of other states prior to the ratification of the Constitution).
81. See Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852).
82. See Alan J. Meese, The Sherman Act and Intrastate Restraints: A Case Study in
Illegitimate Doctrinal Evolution (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author); see also
Cushman, supra note 52, at 1101-06 (describing the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as “[p]romoting free trade while
preserving the powers to tax and regulate”); id. at 1101 (“As the national economy became
increasingly integrated in the years following the Civil War, the Court began a conscious and
increasingly aggressive campaign to break down local barriers to interstate trade through a
‘free-trade’ construction of the dormant Commerce Clause.”).
83. See Meese, supra note 82.
84. See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).
85. See LeBoeuf, supra note 78, at 574-92 (explaining how interstate externalities can
result in a legislative race to the bottom).
86. See Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large
Corporation, 1875-1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 648 (1978) (“The Supreme Court's commerce
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The direct/indirect test was not an artifact of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Courts repeatedly embraced the taxonomy for the first one-
third of the twentieth century as well, employing the test to police
the boundaries between state and federal authority.87 The test did
its most famous work during the Great Depression, in A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.88 In that case, the United
States indicted four small businessmen for competing too much,
contrary to the New York Live Poultry Code, which President
Roosevelt had promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery
Act.89 The defendants violated code provisions setting maximum
hours and minimum wages, requiring defendants to report their
weekly prices to the code authority, and preventing the defendants
from selling less than half a coop of chickens or allowing customers
to select individual chickens.90 The defendants claimed that these
regulations of purely local activity exceeded the scope of the com-
merce power.91 The government responded that such restrictions
clause decisions of the 1875-1890 period ... firmly established [its] role as the umpire of the
nation's free-trade network.”); id. (explaining that during the late nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court “monitor[ed] the free-trade unit in the silence of Congress”); see also Cush-
man, supra note 52, at 1107 (“The Court’s use of the dormant Commerce Clause to vitiate
such parochial legislation played a critical, instrumental role in opening a national market.”);
id. at 1107 n.96 (collecting sources to the same effect).
87. See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 520-21 (1922) (sustaining federal
regulation of deceptive practices at stockyards because such practices, when combined with
other similar practices, would “probably ... be used in conspiracies against interstate com-
merce or constitute a direct and undue burden on it”) (emphasis added); The Shreveport Rate
Case, 234 U.S. 342, 354 (1914) (holding that Congress possessed authority to preempt state
regulation of intrastate railroad rates that “directly interfer[ed]” with interstate rates); The
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 431-33 (1913) (rejecting a challenge to Minnesota’s reg-
ulation of intrastate railway rates because the impact of such rates on interstate commerce
was merely indirect and thus beyond congressional power); id. at 410-11 (describing the
general rule that state regulation of local activity that indirectly impacts interstate commerce
exceeds the scope of the commerce power); see also Cushman, supra note 52, at 1101-08
(collecting numerous decisions invalidating state regulation of local activity because such
regulations burdened interstate commerce directly and thus regulated interstate commerce
contrary to the presumed intent of Congress); id. at 1116-24 (collecting numerous decisions
sustaining state legislation because such laws merely impacted interstate commerce
“indirectly”).
88. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
89. See id. 519 nn.1-2 (describing the sixty-count indictment of the defendants).
90. See id. at 527-28 (describing various alleged violations of which defendants were
convicted). The code required the defendants and their rivals to engage in block booking of
chickens. See id. at 524-25.
91. See id. at 542.
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on putative local activity were necessary to stimulate an economic
recovery from the Great Depression.92 Simply letting free markets
set prices and terms of employment encouraged firms to seek com-
petitive advantage by reducing wages and prices and increasing
hours, after which other firms would follow suit.93 By preventing
such unfair competition, the Poultry Code, along with codes gov-
erning other industries, purportedly “eliminat[ed] ... the wastes and
excesses of competition which the depression had intensified[,] and
... establish[ed] ... a level below which wage cutting should not
proceed.”94 The result was removal of obstructions of commerce and
thus “a necessary stimulus to start in motion the cumulative forces
making for expanding commercial activity.”95
The Court rejected this contention via a straightforward applica-
tion of the direct/indirect test. It was true, the Court said, that the
defendants bought chickens raised in other states and shipped them
to New York City before defendants slaughtered and sold them.96
However, the code provisions defendants violated had nothing to do
with the interstate shipment of chickens, but instead governed the
prices of local activities (slaughtering and selling chickens) and
wages and hours of employees performing this local activity.97 While
such activities certainly had some impact on interstate commerce,
they were not the sort of effects that gave rise to the existence of
federal regulatory authority.98
To support its analysis, the Court invoked a series of anti-
trust decisions that had repeatedly employed the direct/indirect
92. See Meese, supra note 38, at 320 (describing the government’s claim that such
regulation would enhance the “purchasing power” of employees and thus induce consumption
and resulting economic recovery).
93. See Brief for the United States at 47-48, A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (No. 854); id. at 53-54; id. at 87 (“As prices and wages are cut by
individual employers or groups of employers, others in self-preservation are compelled to do
the same. The process tends to repeat itself at constantly lower and lower levels.”).
94. Id. at 90.
95. Id. at 91; id. (“A reduction in hours of labor ... distributes wage payments among a
larger number of workers ... increas[ing] the proportion of such payments promptly spent.”);
id. at 86-87 (“The justification under the commerce clause for particular provisions in the
codes may be based in part upon their relation to the revival of business and commerce.”);
see also Meese, supra note 38, at 301-02.
96. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 520-21.
97. See id. at 550-51.
98. See id. at 551.
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distinction when determining the reach of the Sherman Act, noting
that many had involved labor disputes.99 While these decisions
nominally implemented statutory language, the Court said, “the
distinction between direct and indirect effects” was “a fundamental
one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system.”100
Failure to recognize this distinction and treatment of the impact of
defendants’ wages and prices as direct would “destroy” the distinc-
tion between intrastate and interstate commerce, a distinction the
Commerce Clause itself created.101
Similar logic, the Court said, required the Court to invalidate the
Code’s regulation of local marketing practices, such as the require-
ment that defendants sell entire coops of chickens, the ban on sel-
ling unhealthy chickens, and of sales “not in accord with ordinances
of the City of New York,” and the requirement to report prices to
code authorities.102 Any impact that such practices might have
“upon interstate commerce was only indirect.”103 The Court also
distinguished such an effect from the effect of certain trade re-
straints within the poultry industry the Court had treated as
“direct” under the Sherman Act.104
The Court reiterated this approach a year later, in Carter v.
Carter Coal, where it invalidated a federal statute that sought to
impose minimum wages on mines that shipped coal in interstate
commerce.105 The United States sought to distinguish Schechter on
the grounds that the chickens there “had come to rest” before the
code provisions applied to the defendants’ slaughtering business.106
By contrast, the regulated coal mines shipped their products in in-
terstate commerce.107 Invoking Schechter, the Court held that this
99. See id. at 547-48.
100. Id. at 548.
101. See id. at 550.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. In particular, the Court distinguished Local 167, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1934), on the grounds that the challenged
conduct there, also involving the live poultry industry, “‘substantially and directly ...
restrain[ed] and burden[ed] the untrammeled shipment and movement of the poultry’ while
unquestionably ... in interstate commerce.” See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 544-45 (quoting Local
167, 291 U.S. at 299-300).
105. 298 U.S. 238, 316 (1936).
106. See id. at 309.
107. See id. at 260.
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was a distinction without a difference, and that the regulations in
question reached local practices that impacted interstate commerce
only indirectly.108 The magnitude of the coal industry’s operations
were beside the point, the Court said.109 What mattered instead was
the nature of the impact.110 Only states, the Court said, could reach
such local conduct.111 Chief Justice Hughes concurred with the
Court’s holding that Congress lacked the authority to regulate the
wages and hours of miners, because such activity only impacted
interstate commerce indirectly.112
III. THE SHERMAN ACT AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE COURT’S
COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Sherman Act prohibits contracts “in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States.”113 The Supreme Court first
gave meaning to this language in United States v. E. C. Knight.114
There, a firm incorporated in New Jersey took advantage of recent
changes in New Jersey law and purchased the shares of several
Philadelphia sugar refiners, thereby obtaining a 98 percent share of
108. See id. at 307-08 (“The distinction between a direct and an indirect effect turns, not
upon the magnitude of either the cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which
the effect has been brought about.”).
109. See id.
110. Id. (“Whether the effect of a given activity or condition is direct or indirect is not
always easy to determine. The word ‘direct’ implies that the activity or condition invoked or
blamed shall operate proximately—not mediately, remotely, or collaterally—to produce the
effect. It connotes the absence of an efficient intervening agency or condition. And the extent
of the effect bears no logical relation to its character. The distinction between a direct and an
indirect effect turns, not upon the magnitude of either the cause or the effect, but entirely
upon the manner in which the effect has been brought about. If the production by one man
of a single ton of coal intended for interstate sale and shipment, and actually so sold and
shipped, affects interstate commerce indirectly, the effect does not become direct by multi-
plying the tonnage, or increasing the number of men employed, or adding to the expense or
complexities of the business, or by all combined.”).
111. See id. at 308-09.
112. See id. at 317 (Hughes, C.J., concurring). In the parlance then-Justice Hughes had
previously employed in The Shreveport Rate Case, low wages or long hours could not cause an
“injury” to interstate commerce. See infra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (emphasis added). Section 2 prohibits monopolization and
“attempt[s] to monopolize ... any part of the trade or commerce among the several States.” Id.
§ 2.
114. See 156 U.S. 1, 9 (1895).
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the nation’s sugar production.115 Most of newly created firm’s output
would be consumed by citizens of other states.116 The United States
challenged the transaction as contrary to the Sherman Act, alleging
that the defendant had “monopolized the manufacture and sale of
refined sugar in the United States, and controlled the price of
sugar,” and that the defendant would thereby “exact and secure
large sums of money from the State of Pennsylvania, and from the
other States of the United States, and from all other purchasers.”117
The Court did not take issue with the government’s allegations
that the transaction would confer a “practical monopoly” upon
defendants that would thus empower defendants to exact a “tribute”
from consumers in various states.118 But did the merger “restrain[ ]
... commerce among the several States”119 or “monopolize” part of
that commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act?120 To
answer this question the Court referred to its pre-1890 Commerce
Clause jurisprudence,121 which of course had been “on the books”
when Congress passed the Act. Most notably, the Court invoked
decisions evaluating Commerce Clause challenges to state regula-
tion of intrastate activity.122 According to the Court, the outcome of
115. See id. at 3 (noting that the nation’s only remaining independent sugar refinery,
“Revere of Boston,” “produced annually about two per cent of the total amount of sugar
refined”); see also Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929,
49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 681 (1989) (describing various amendments to New Jersey corporate
law from 1888 to 1893 allowing New Jersey corporations to hold stock in other companies and
to merge with rivals).
116. See E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17.
117. Id. at 2-4.
118. See id. at 10-11 (declining to consider whether the transaction would produce ef-
ficiencies that would result in lower prices, or whether the prospect of entry by former
shareholders of rivals would undermine any restraint).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
120. Id. § 2.
121. See E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13-15.
122. See id. (discussing Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888), Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517
(1886), and Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568 (1852)). It should be noted that neither Coe
nor Veazie expressly invoked the direct/indirect distinction. But several other decisions
announced before the Sherman Act did invoke the distinction and relied upon it as the basis
for the decision. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322 (1890); Smith v. Alabama,
124 U.S. 465, 474 (1888); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488 (1887); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 135 (1876); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102 (1876). Kidd, it should be noted, had
invoked Hall, Sherlock, Munn, and Gibbons for the proposition that police regulations only
ran afoul of the Commerce Clause if they affected interstate commerce directly. See Kidd, 128
U.S. at 23.
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such decisions, including Gibbons itself, had rested upon the dis-
tinction between “direct” and “indirect” impacts on interstate com-
merce, invalidating only that state legislation that produced the
former.123 
Congress, the Court said, had adopted the Sherman Act in light
of these “well-settled principles,” with the result that the Act did
not reach intrastate activities, such as mergers between manu-
facturers that produced only indirect effects on interstate com-
merce.124 Instead, states possessed exclusive jurisdiction over such
conduct as part of their more general power “to protect the lives,
health, and property of [their] citizens, and to preserve good order
and the public morals.”125 
This result, the Court said, required dismissal of the indict-
ment.126 Given this “view which we take of the case,” the Court said,
there was no need to discuss the views of “political economists,
[that] aggregations of capital may reduce prices,” or whether “no
objectionable restraint was imposed” because “the original stock-
holders of the Philadelphia refineries after becoming stockholders
of the [defendant] might go into competition with themselves, or,
parting with that stock, might set up again for themselves.”127 The
Court suggested a possible exception to its holding, however, noting
that the United States had not alleged that the defendants, in form-
ing the new firm, intended to restrain interstate commerce.128 The
123. See E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 15-16 (“In Gibbons v. Ogden, Brown v. Maryland, and
other cases often cited, the state laws, which were held inoperative, were instances of direct
interference with, or regulations of, interstate or international commerce, yet in Kidd v.
Pearson the refusal of a State to allow articles to be manufactured within her borders even
for export was held not to directly affect external commerce, and state legislation which, in
a great variety of ways, affected interstate commerce and persons engaged in it, has been
frequently sustained because the interference was not direct.”); id. at 15 (citing Veazie to
exemplify proper understanding of the commerce power); see also supra notes 62-68, and
accompanying text.
124. See E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16 (“It was in the light of well-settled principles that the
act of July 2, 1890, was framed. Congress did not attempt thereby to assert the power to deal
with monopoly directly as such.”).
125. See id. at 11 (“The relief of the citizens of each State from the burden of monopoly and
the evils resulting from the restraint of trade among such citizens was left with the States to
deal with.”); see also Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the
Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869-1903, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 304, 305 (1979).
126. See E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16-18.
127. See id. at 10-11.
128. Id. at 17 (“There was nothing in the proofs to indicate any intention to put a restraint
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implication, of course, was that proof of such intent may have
produced a different result, although the Court did not explain
exactly what such intent would entail.
Justice Harlan issued a lengthy and vigorous dissent.129 He did
not take issue with the direct/indirect distinction, which he himself
had invoked or implicitly endorsed in previous decisions.130 Invoking
Gibbons’s assertion that Congress could regulate “those internal
concerns which affect the States generally,”131 Harlan contended
that the challenged merger and resulting monopoly “affects, not
incidentally, but directly, the people of all the States,”132 because it
had the “object and effect of controlling not simply the manufacture
but the price of refined sugar throughout the whole of the United
States.”133 Harlan also contended that the merging parties necessar-
ily intended such an anticompetitive result.134
Rhetorically and analytically at least, E. C. Knight set the tone
for the Court’s jurisprudence on Sherman Act federalism for the
next four decades. In three 1898 decisions, the Court thrice re-
iterated E. C. Knight’s invocation of the Court’s pre-Sherman Act
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, particularly the direct/indirect
upon trade or commerce, and the fact, as we have seen, that trade or commerce might be
indirectly affected was not enough to entitle complainants to a decree.”).
129. See id. at 18-46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
130. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 328 (1890) (Harlan, J.) (invalidating a
state regulation that directly obstructed interstate commerce). Justice Harlan also joined or
endorsed other decisions invoking the direct/indirect distinction without comment. See, e.g.,
E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (invoking Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99
(1876) for the proposition that state legislation that only impacts interstate commerce
indirectly exceeds the scope of Congress’s authority); see also, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S.
1, 23 (1888) (joined by Harlan, J.) (stating that only state legislation which impacts interstate
commerce “directly” regulates interstate commerce); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 474
(1888) (joined by Harlan, J.) (same).
131. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 21 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824)).
132. See id. at 33 (“Any combination, therefore, that disturbs or unreasonably obstructs
freedom in buying and selling articles manufactured to be sold to persons in other States or
to be carried to other States—a freedom that cannot exist if the right to buy and sell is
fettered by unlawful restraints that crush out competition—affects, not incidentally, but
directly, the people of all the States.”).
133. Id.; see also id. at 25 (emphasis omitted) (“But a general restraint of trade has often
resulted from combinations formed for the purpose of controlling prices by destroying the
opportunity of buyers and sellers to deal with each other upon the basis of fair, open, free
competition.”).
134. See id. at 43-44.
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distinction, as the proper articulation of the boundary between state
and federal regulatory power and thus the reach of the Sherman
Act.135 In 1899, the Court again drew upon its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to address the claim that the clause did not authorize
Congress to reach private agreements.136 The Court unanimously
ruled that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to reach pri-
vate agreements, because such agreements could have the very
same economic impact on interstate commerce as analogous state
laws, that is, could impact such commerce “directly” and thus “reg-
ulate” such commerce.137 Elaborating on the rationale for this di-
vision of authority between states and the national government, the
Court echoed the antiprotectionism and free trade principle that
animated its pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence.138 If states
135. See Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 594 (1898) (citing several decisions
evaluating challenges to state legislation, as well as E. C. Knight for the proposition that the
Sherman Act does not reach agreements that impact interstate commerce indirectly); id. (“An
agreement may in a variety of ways affect interstate commerce, just as state legislation may,
and yet, like it, be entirely valid, because the interference produced by the agreement or by
the legislation is not direct.... An agreement among the owners of such facilities, to charge not
less than a minimum rate for their use, cannot be condemned as illegal under the act of
Congress.” (emphasis added)); Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 616 (1898) (“‘There
are many cases, however, where the acknowledged powers of a State may be exerted and
applied in such a manner as to affect foreign or interstate commerce without being intended
to operate as commercial regulations.’ The same is true as to certain kinds of agreements
entered into between persons engaged in the same business for the direct and bona fide
purpose of properly and reasonably regulating the conduct of their business among
themselves and with the public.” (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 473 (1888)));
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (“In Hopkins v. United States,
decided at this term, we say that the statute applies only to those contracts whose direct and
immediate effect is a restraint upon interstate commerce, and that to treat the act as
condemning all agreements under which, as a result, the cost of conducting an interstate
commercial business may be increased, would enlarge the application of the act far beyond
the fair meaning of the language used. The effect upon interstate commerce must not be
indirect or incidental only.” (citations omitted)).
136. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 229-30 (1899).
137. See id. (“If certain kinds of private contracts do directly, as already stated, limit or
restrain, and hence regulate interstate commerce, why should not the power of Congress
reach those contracts just the same as if the legislation of some State had enacted the
provisions contained in them? The private contracts may in truth be as far reaching in their
effect upon interstate commerce as would the legislation of a single State of the same
character.”); id at 230 (rejecting the claim that liberty of contract protected such agreements
“because the direct results of such contracts might be the regulation of commerce among the
States, possibly quite as effectually as if a State had passed a statute of like tenor as the
contract”).
138. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
1360 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1335
possessed authority over such agreements, the Court said, they
would adopt different and conflicting measures, depending upon
each state’s “particular interest.”139 Because of its “general and great
importance,” the Court continued, the subject of interstate com-
merce “has been granted to Congress as the proper representative
of the nation at large.”140 The Sherman Act, the Court said, thus
reached all private agreements that impacted interstate commerce
directly, including the cartel agreement before the Court, which set
unreasonable prices for the interstate sales of pipe.141 The Court
distinguished E. C. Knight, which had involved manufacturing.142
The cartel agreement before the Court in Addyston Pipe, by
contrast, restricted competition with respect to interstate commer-
cial transactions, which Gibbons and its progeny had considered
part of interstate commerce.143 The Court also reiterated that the
Act did not reach agreements that merely restrained intrastate
commerce, even if those agreements produced prices for intrastate
139. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 231 (“If it should be held that Congress has no power
and the state legislatures have full and complete authority to thus far regulate interstate
commerce by means of their control over private contracts between individuals or
corporations, then the legislation of the different States might and probably would differ in
regard to the matter, according to what each State might regard as its own particular
interest.”).
140. See id. at 230.
141. See id. at 235-38 (rejecting defendants’ argument that the agreement’s impact was
indirect because it set reasonable prices).
142. See id. at 240 (“[E. C. Knight] was decided upon the principle that a combination
simply to control manufacture was not a violation of the act of Congress, because such a
contract or combination did not directly control or affect interstate commerce.”).
143. See id. at 240-41 (“The direct and immediate result of the combination was therefore
necessarily a restraint upon interstate commerce in respect of articles manufactured by any
of the parties to it to be transported beyond the State in which they were made. The
defendants by reason of this combination and agreement could only send their goods out of
the State in which they were manufactured for sale and delivery in another State, upon the
terms and pursuant to the provisions of such combination.”); id. at 246 (“Any combination
among dealers in that kind of commodity, which in its direct and immediate effect, forecloses
all competition and enhances the purchase price for which such commodity would otherwise
be delivered at its destination in another State, would in our opinion be one in restraint of
trade or commerce among the States.”).
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transactions above the competitive level.144 States, the Court said,
had exclusive authority over such agreements.145
From 1895 until 1933 (at least), in decision after decision, the
Court employed the direct/indirect formulation when determining
whether a contract in restraint of trade also restrained commerce
among the several states.146 Thus, a conspiracy to shut down a
factory or mine was generally considered an indirect restraint, even
when the factory or mine’s owner sold its output in other states
and/or purchased inputs from firms in other states.147 So was a
conspiracy to shut down local construction that employed inputs
purchased from other states.148 The same was true for a defendant’s
refusal to accept advertisements placed by a plaintiff’s advertising
agency as part of an alleged effort to monopolize the magazine
advertising market, even though the defendant distributed its
magazines in several states.149
144. Id. at 247 (“Although the jurisdiction of Congress over commerce among the States is
full and complete, it is not questioned that it has none over that which is wholly within a
State, and therefore none over combinations or agreements so far as they relate to a restraint
of such trade or commerce.... The combination herein described covers both commerce which
is wholly within a State and also that which is interstate.”).
145. See id.
146. See Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 108 (1933) (holding that strikes
aimed at local builders exceeded the commerce power and the Sherman Act even though such
strikes reduced the purchase of steel from other states); Indus. Ass’n of S.F. v. United States,
268 U.S. 64, 82 (1925) (holding that the Act did not reach a conspiracy between employers and
dealers to deprive local union-friendly firms of inputs); United Leather Workers Int’l Union
v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 467 (1924); United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 408 (1922); United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 542
(1913); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1911); Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1905); Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 228; Hopkins v. United
States, 171 U.S. 578, 586 (1898); Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 615 (1898); United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 560-61 (1898); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
147. Leather Workers, 265 U.S. at 464, 471 (finding that the Act did not reach a conspiracy
to shut down several factories that purchased inputs from out-of-state suppliers and sold most
of their output to purchasers in other states); Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 407-08 (holding that
the Act did not reach a conspiracy to shut down a mine that exported most of its output to
other states).
148. See Levering, 289 U.S. at 107 (holding that the Act did not reach strikes aimed at local
builders even though such strikes reduced the purchase of steel from other states); id.
(“Restraint of interstate commerce was not an object of the [local] conspiracy.... It is this
exclusively local aim, and not the fortuitous and incidental effect upon interstate commerce,
which gives character to the conspiracy.”); Indus. Ass’n of S.F., 268 U.S. at 80 (same).
149. Blumenstock Bros. Advert. Agency v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 252 U.S. 436, 444 (1920)
(“[T]here is no ground for claiming that the transactions which are the basis of the present
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By contrast, the Act did reach a conspiracy to corner the sales of
cotton on the New York exchange, admittedly intrastate conduct,
because such a conspiracy predictably monopolized the national
market for cotton and thus raised the prices of interstate cotton
sales, a proper object of federal commercial regulation.150 The Act
also reached a conspiracy between union members to prevent the
use of the plaintiffs’ stone, produced in nonunion Indiana quarries,
on building projects in several other states.151 The restraints “had
for their primary aim restraint of the interstate sale and shipment
of the commodity.... [and] [i]nterstate commerce was the direct
object of attack,” in an effort to protect other forms of stone pro-
duced in unionized settings from competition.152 Such restraints, the
Court said, resulted in “the gravely probable disadvantage of
producers, purchasers and the public.”153 Finally, the Act reached a
conspiracy between Chicago meatpackers to depress the price at
which they purchased meat from ranchers in other states, because,
while entailing local acts, interstate commerce was the “direct ob-
ject” of attack “for the sake of which the several specific acts and
courses of conduct [were] done and adopted.”154
suit, concerning advertising in journals to be subsequently distributed in interstate commerce,
are contracts which directly affect such commerce. Their incidental relation thereto cannot
lay the groundwork for such contentions as are undertaken to be here maintained under ...
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.”).
150. Patten, 226 U.S. at 540-42 (finding that intrastate restraint effectively monopolized
the national market for cotton, and thereby raising the inference that defendants intended
to directly restrain interstate commerce).
151. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters’ Ass’n of N.A., 274 U.S. 37,
54-55 (1927).
152. Id. at 46; see id. at 54 (finding that the Act reached the challenged restraint because
the defendants had “adopted a course of conduct which directly and substantially curtailed,
or threatened thus to curtail, the natural flow in interstate commerce of a very large
proportion of the building limestone production of the entire country” (emphasis added)).
153. Id. at 54.
154. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905) (“Although the combination
alleged embraces restraint and monopoly of trade within a single State, its effect upon
commerce among the States is not accidental, secondary, remote or merely probable. On the
allegations of the bill the latter commerce no less, perhaps even more, than commerce within
a single State is an object of attack. Moreover, it is a direct object, it is that for the sake of
which the several specific acts and courses of conduct are done and adopted. Therefore the
case is not like United States v. E. C. Knight ... where the subject matter of the combination
was manufacture and the direct object monopoly of manufacture within a State.” (internal
citations omitted)); see also Anderson v. Shipowners Ass’n of the Pac. Coast, 272 U.S. 359, 363
(1926) (finding that the Sherman Act reached a horizontal agreement setting wages and other
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Application of this test was often fact-intensive, sometimes
requiring the Court to assess the market positions of the parties and
resulting impact of these positions on the price of interstate sales.155
Taken together, and as demonstrated in greater detail elsewhere,
these decisions reflect an effort to distinguish restraints that harm-
ed consumers in more than one state from those that produced
harms confined to a single state.156
But what about E. C. Knight, the grandfather of the Sherman
Act’s direct/indirect test? Surely the challenged conduct there, as
Justice Harlan explained, injured consumers in more than one
working conditions of seamen operating vessels on interstate voyages because restraint of
interstate commerce was “the necessary and direct consequence of the combination and the
acts of the associations under it” (citing Patten, 226 U.S. at 543)); United States v. Brims, 272
U.S. 549, 552-53 (1926) (finding that the Sherman Act reached conspiracy among union
members and contractors to exclude millwork manufactured in other states from Chicago
construction sites, because “the so-called outside competition was cut down and thereby
interstate commerce directly and materially impeded”).
155. See Stone Cutters’ Ass’n, 274 U.S. at 54 (finding that the restraint directly impacted
interstate commerce because among other things it impacted “a very large proportion of the
building limestone production of the entire country”); United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 412-13 (1922) (finding that the defendants could not have
intended to affect the price of interstate coal transactions because the mine targeted by the
restraint produced 5000 tons of coal per week, compared to “a national production of from
[10,000,000] to [15,000,000] tons a week,” and a regional production of “150,000 tons a week,”
with the result that the restraint “would have no appreciable effect upon the price of coal or
non-union competition”); id. at 412 (“The saving in the price per ton of coal under non-union
conditions was said by plaintiffs’ witnesses to be from [seventeen] to [twenty] cents, but surely
no one would say that such saving on 5,000 tons would have a substantial effect on prices of
coal in interstate commerce.”); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 238
(1899) (holding that the challenged agreement affected interstate commerce directly after
rejecting defendants’ argument that the agreement set reasonable prices); id. at 235-38 (four-
page fact-intensive analysis of defendants’ claim that the agreement set reasonable prices);
Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 617 (1898) (finding that restraint only impacted
interstate commerce indirectly in part because the Association imposing the restraint faced
competition from numerous rivals that prevented the restraint from raising prices above the
competitive level); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 595-96 (1898) (finding that the
challenged restraint only impacted interstate commerce indirectly because the charges it set
were not “exorbitant”).
156. Compare Patten, 226 U.S. at 542, with Indus. Ass’n of S.F. v. United States, 268 U.S.
64, 80 (1925) (finding that the challenged restraint was intrastate because it did not limit “the
freedom of the outside manufacturer to sell and ship or of the local contractor to buy”). For
additional application of this distinction, see also Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 246 (Act applied
to agreement that “enhances the purchase price for which such commodity would otherwise
be delivered at its destination in another State”); id. at 247-48 (Act does not apply to
agreement enhancing the purchase price for which product would be delivered in the same
state). See generally Meese, supra note 82.
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state, indeed, in most if not all the states of the union!157 And yet,
eight members of the Court held that the merger to monopoly would
only affect interstate commerce indirectly.158 If the genesis of the
direct/indirect test was so fatally flawed, how can one be confident
that the test reflected a bona fide effort to allocate to Congress the
amount of authority “necessary,” as Gibbons would have said,
thereby implementing the “genius and character of the whole
government” and protecting interstate commerce from harmful
restraints?159 Indeed, Wickard and its antitrust progeny focused
significant fire on E. C. Knight in their efforts to discredit the
direct/indirect test.160
This critique, however, assumes that E. C. Knight’s holding that
restraints on production could never directly obstruct interstate
commerce remained good law throughout the period in question.161
It did not—at least not as an exposition of the Sherman Act. To be
sure, the Court continued to employ the direct/indirect test and
never formally overruled E. C. Knight in total. It did, however, reach
results that were inconsistent with that decision and more consis-
tent with the application of the direct/indirect formula by Justice
Harlan’s E. C. Knight dissent.162 Indeed, Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States, which famously announced Section 1’s Rule
of Reason, expressly rejected the defendant’s claim, based upon
E. C. Knight, that the Sherman Act did not reach monopolizing
conduct that took the form of mergers or other production-related
decisions occurring within a single state.163 American Tobbaco,
157. See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 18 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 16-18 (majority opinion).
159. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824).
160. See infra notes 192-214 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 192-214 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
163. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1911) (“But all the
structure upon which this argument proceeds is based upon the decision in E. C. Knight Co.
The view, however, which the argument takes of that case and the arguments based upon that
view have been so repeatedly pressed upon this court in connection with the interpretation
and enforcement of the Anti-Trust Act, and have been so necessarily and expressly decided
to be unsound as to cause the contentions to be plainly foreclosed and to require no express
notice” (citations omitted)); see also Brief for Appellants at 38-46, Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1
(No. 398) (“The Sherman Act has no application to the transfer to, or acquisition by, the
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey of the stocks of the various manufacturing and
producing corporations, for the reason that such transfer and acquisition were not acts of
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decided two weeks after Standard Oil, similarly rejected such an
argument, albeit without mentioning E. C. Knight.164 Moreover, in
United States v. Patten, the Court applied the Act to a scheme to
corner the market for cotton bought and sold on the New York
Cotton Exchange.165 The Court held that the challenged restraint
would, if effective, raise the national price of “cotton, a product of
the Southern States, largely used and consumed in the Northern
States ... therefore inflict[ing] upon the public the injuries which the
Anti-trust Act is designed to prevent.”166 
In short, while the Court retained E. C. Knight’s direct/indirect
formulation, the Justices adjusted application of the test so as to
reach results contrary to that decision. While the Court did not
provide a detailed articulation of the rationale for departing from
E. C. Knight’s result, one might speculate that two interrelated
interstate or foreign commerce, nor direct and immediate in their effect on interstate and
foreign commerce, nor within the power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce.”); id. at 41-46 (repeatedly invoking E. C. Knight in support of this argument); id.
at 41 (“The case of [E. C. Knight] is a conclusive authority that the acquisition of the stocks
of the manufacturing and production corporations is not a transaction subject to national
control or regulation or within the Sherman Act.”); id. at 45 (contending that the defendants’
purchases of rivals “and the transaction involved in the Knight case cannot be differentiated.
One cannot be within the commercial power of Congress and the other not; one cannot be
subject to the Sherman Act and the other not”).
164. See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 150-51 (1911) (recounting
defendant’s argument regarding “their right under state charters by virtue of which they
existed to own and possess the property which they held and further averred that they were
engaged in manufacturing and that any combination amongst them related only to that
subject, and therefore was not within the Anti-trust Act”); id. at 183-84 (“We do not, for the
sake of brevity, moreover, stop to examine and discuss the various propositions urged in the
argument at bar for the purpose of demonstrating that the subject matter of the combination
which we find to exist and the combination itself, are not within the scope of the Anti-trust
Act because when rightly considered they are merely matters of intrastate commerce and
therefore subject alone to state control. We have done this because the want of merit in all the
arguments advanced on such subjects is so completely established by the prior decisions of
this court, as pointed out in the Standard Oil Case, as not to require restatement.”).
165. 226 U.S. 525, 542 (1913).
166. Id. at 542-43 (“The commodity to be cornered was cotton, a product of the Southern
States, largely used and consumed in the Northern States. It was a subject of interstate trade
and commerce, and through that channel it was obtained from time to time by the many
manufacturers of cotton fabrics in the Northern States .... [T]he conspiracy was to reach and
to bring within its dominating influence the entire cotton trade of the country. Bearing in
mind that such was the nature, object and scope of the conspiracy, we regard it as altogether
plain that by its necessary operation it would directly and materially impede and burden the
due course of trade and commerce among the States and therefore inflict upon the public the
injuries which the Anti-trust Act is designed to prevent.”).
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factors explain the change. First, the Court had a different under-
standing of the economic consequences of the sort of intrastate
transactions initially sheltered by E. C. Knight’s seemingly categori-
cal rule exempting manufacturing from the Act.167 That is, the Court
apparently came to understand that, say, a merger to monopoly
could confer upon the parties the power to increase prices well above
the competitive level, contrary to the predictions of the classical
economic paradigm that was ascendant when Congress passed the
Sherman Act.168 Thus, while E. C. Knight itself declined to opine on
whether the defendant could maintain a monopoly absent state or
contractual barriers to entry, subsequent decisions of the Court
answered this question, expressly or implicitly, in the affirmative.169
Second, and relatedly, the Justices presumably understood, as they
had explained in Addyston Pipe, that states lacked proper incentives
to develop optimal rules governing conduct that produced harms
exceeding the boundaries of the regulating state.170 Indeed, by the
167. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
168. See Meese, supra note 38, at 15-23; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND
AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 282-83 (1991) (“Within the classical paradigm, monopoly prices
could never be earned in any industry unless people were artificially restrained from
entering.... A mere agreement among sellers to fix prices was of little concern, provided that
neither the price fixers nor the state forbade others from entering the field. If the cartel
members sought to charge monopoly prices, new competition would immediately frustrate
their attempt.”); Thomas Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, 54 PRINCETON
REV. 233, 259 (1878) (concluding that combinations to raise prices could only be successful if
“accomplished through means which are no part of any regular business”); id. at 260 (arguing
that firms could only achieve a true monopoly by means of “sovereign grant, ... combination,
or ... violence and terror”).
169. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235-38 (1899)
(finding that the defendants collectively possessed more than a majority of the relevant
region’s productive capacity and that the cartel set prices well above the reasonable level); see
also George Gunton, The Economic and Social Aspect of Trusts, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 385, 403 (1888)
(“If the gates for the admission of new competitive capital are always open, the economic effect
is substantially the same as if the new competitor were already there.”); Meese, supra note
38, at 66-67 (explaining how Justice Peckham, the author of Addyston Pipe, came to realize
that private firms could raise prices above the competitive level without state aid and without
predatory tactics); cf. People ex rel Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham,
J., dissenting), aff'd, 143 U.S. 517 (1892) (contending that the cartel of floating grain elevators
could not maintain prices above the competitive level because high prices at “just that
moment” would attract new entry that would drive prices back down to the competitive level).
170. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 235-42; see also N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 330 (1904); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of the
Firm: A Historical Perspective, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 75, 78-91 (1990) (documenting how
developments in state corporate law, particularly New Jersey, undermined the ability of
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early twentieth century, and before Standard Oil, politicians and
legal commentators recognized that state corporate law, particular-
ly New Jersey law (where the acquiring firm in E. C. Knight was
incorporated), facilitated the formation of monopolies or near mo-
nopolies that exercised market power to the detriment of consumers
in states other than the state of incorporation.171 Just seven years
before Standard Oil, the Court rejected the claim that the lawful
creation of a holding company under New Jersey law was immune
from attack under the Sherman Act.172 In short, E. C. Knight’s prog-
eny embraced the same standard that E. C. Knight inherited from
pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a standard based upon
the antiprotectionism principle.173 But these post-E. C. Knight de-
cisions applied this standard in light of new information that coun-
seled results different from the result reached in E. C. Knight.174
The Sherman Act’s manifestation of the direct/indirect test
survived into the 1930s.175 While nominally interpretations of a
statute, subject to congressional revision, Sherman Act decisions
eventually were seen as articulations of the constitutional boundary
between state and federal authority over economic activity.176
individual states to protect their citizens from exercises of market power created by mergers);
McCurdy, supra note 125 (explaining how economic incentives deterred states from excluding
from their territories firms incorporated in other states).
171. See Grandy, supra note 115, at 678-84, 687, 691 (describing New Jersey’s success in
the late nineteenth century at attracting incorporations with large industrial concerns by
empowering such firms to merge with rivals with impunity, thereby creating a “legal
externality” vis-à-vis other states); id. at 684-85 (describing contemporary recognition that
“New Jersey’s policy undermined the antitrust laws of other states” and within New Jersey);
Joseph F. Mahoney, Backsliding Convert: Woodrow Wilson and the “Seven Sisters,” 18 AM. Q.
71, 72-73 (1966) (recounting then-Governor Woodrow Wilson’s 1910 campaign promise to
reform New Jersey corporate law if reelected); id. at 73-78 (describing the evolution and
adoption of seven bills that imposed new antitrust rules on corporate entities and a
prospective ban on holding companies); see also Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2008) (describing various calls from 1900 to 1917 for nationalization
of corporate law vis-à-vis firms engaged in interstate commerce).
172. See N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 345.
173. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
174. See Bruce Johnsen & Moin A. Yahya, The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction: A
Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW 403, 445 (2004) (contending that
a focus on interstate spillovers supports the conclusion that Standard Oil properly abandon-
ed the result reached in E. C. Knight); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1165, 1224-28 (1993).
175. See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, and as explained earlier, the Court sometimes drew upon
this body of law and the results it produced when determining the
appropriate reach of the commerce power in other contexts.177
Perhaps most famously, in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. Unit-
ed States, the Court invoked numerous such decisions as illustrating
the repeated application of the direct/indirect test and the resulting
limits on the scope of the commerce power.178 Just two years later,
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,179 the Court again in-
voked several Sherman Act precedents, this time for the proposition
that the Sherman Act can reach conduct perpetrated by or involving
employees engaged in production, so long as that conduct produced
the appropriate (direct) impact on interstate commerce.180 Such
constitutionalization of the Sherman Act caselaw did not begin with
Schechter. More than a decade earlier, the Court derived the proper
line between state and federal authority over intrastate activities in
stockyards from three antitrust decisions.181 Even before that, the
177. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
178. 295 U.S. 495, 543-48 (1935).
179. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
180. See id. at 38-39 (invoking numerous decisions, including Levering Garrigues v. Morrin,
289 U.S. 103 (1933); Indus. Ass’n of S.F. v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925); Coronado Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 268 U.S. 295 (1925); United Leather Workers’ Int’l Union
v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924); United Mine Workers of. Am. v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1911); and Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
181. Thus, in Stafford v. Wallace, the petitioner invoked Hopkins v. United States and
Anderson v. United States in support of its argument that Congress lacked the authority to
regulate the practices of middle men in the cattle market because the activities of such
individuals produced only indirect effects on interstate commerce. Stafford v. Wallace, 258
U.S. 495, 516, 523-24 (1922). The Court rejected this argument by invoking a different an-
titrust case, Swift & Co. v. United States, explaining that the Court there had found that
various intrastate practices had in fact produced a direct and harmful effect on interstate
commerce. See id. at 523-24 (citing Swift, 196 U.S. 375 (1905)). In the same way, the Court
said: “[t]he act finds and imports this injurious direct effect of such agencies upon interstate
commerce just as the intent of the conspiracy charged in the indictment in the Swift Case tied
together the parts of the scheme there attacked and imported their direct effect upon in-
terstate commerce.” Id. at 525. The Court also noted the suggestion in Hopkins that restraints
producing exorbitant charges for local services could still directly burden interstate commerce
and thus violate the Act. Id. (“Again, if the result of the combination of commission men in the
Hopkins Case had been to impose exorbitant charges on the passage of the live stock through
the stockyards from one State to another, the case would have been different, as the court
suggests. The effect on interstate commerce in such a case would have been direct. Similarly,
in the Anderson Case, if the combination of dealers had been directed to collusion with the
commission men to secure sales at unduly low prices to the dealers and to double
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Court, in an antitrust decision, had invoked Commerce Clause pre-
cedents to exemplify the distinction between direct and indirect re-
straints of interstate commerce when determining whether the Act
reached local conduct.182
IV. WICKARD AND THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS TEST
Congress told Roscoe Filburn he could only plant wheat on 11.1
acres of his land and grow 20.1 bushels of wheat per acre.183 He
instead planted 23 acres and harvested 239 additional bushels of
wheat from the illegal 11.9 acres.184 There was no indication that he
planned to sell the grain in interstate commerce.185 He sued to avoid
the resulting penalty, claiming that the Commerce Clause did not
authorize Congress to regulate the production of grain not destined
for interstate commerce.186 Invoking Schechter and a subsequent
decision relying on Schechter, Filburn claimed that his production
decisions only affected interstate commerce indirectly or remotely
and thus exceeded the scope of Congress’s regulatory power.187 A
dissenting judge below claimed that Filburn’s production, when
combined with that of others, did directly affect commerce.188 But
commissions, or to practice any other fraud or oppression calculated to decrease the price
received by the shipper and increase the price to the purchaser in the passage of live stock
through the stockyards in interstate commerce, this would have been a direct burden on such
commerce and within the Anti-Trust Act.”); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 595-96
(1898) (“It is possible that exorbitant charges for the use of these facilities might have similar
effect as a burden on commerce that a charge up on commerce itself might have. In a case
such as that the remedy would probably be forthcoming.”). Thus, the Court relied upon the
direct/indirect test, as articulated and applied by three different antitrust decisions, to define
the scope of congressional power over local activity.
182. See Blumenstock Bros. Advert. Agency v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 252 U.S. 436, 442-43
(1920) (invoking Int’l Text-book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910); Ware & Leland v. Mobile
County, 209 U.S. 405 (1908); Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 579; and Ficklin v. Shelby Cty. Taxing
Dist., 145 U.S. 1 (1892)).
183. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114 (1942).
184. Id.
185. See id. (“The intended disposition of the crop here involved has not been expressly
stated.”).
186. See id. at 113-14.
187. See Brief for Appellee on Re-Argument at 10-12, Wickard, 317 U.S. 111 (No. 59).
188. See Filburn v. Helke, 43 F. Supp. 1017, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1942) (Allen, J., dissenting)
(“It is true that Congress has no power to regulate intrastate transactions which affect com-
merce only indirectly. But where it is claimed that the local activity sought to be regulated
does not directly affect commerce, decision should not be made by examination of the effect
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Filburn’s argument seemed to be on solid ground, given the innu-
merable previous Supreme Court decisions that employed the
direct/indirect test to determine whether various intrastate activ-
ities such as production, mining, agriculture, construction, and
transportation exceeded the scope of Congress’s regulatory power.189
Stare decisis, it seemed, had a powerful claim.
The Court rejected Filburn’s challenge.190 It did not question
Filburn’s assertion that his production decisions only impacted
interstate commerce indirectly as Schechter and other decisions
would have applied the test.191 Instead, the Court took the opportu-
nity to engage in a lengthy historical exegesis and multifaceted
critique of the large body of precedent that had employed the
direct/indirect test when determining the reach of the commerce
power, particularly as it applied in the context of production.192 The
Court described the test applied in the context of production as “a
few dicta and decisions of this Court, which might be understood” as
holding that “production” and related activities exceeded the scope
of the commerce power, unless there were “special circumstances,”
because their effects upon interstate commerce were indirect “as [a]
matter of law.”193 The “special circumstances” the Court noted, were
those that gave rise to a conclusion that the impact of the regulated
conduct was “direct.”194
The Court began by observing that the test had its origins in
decisions passing on claims that state statutes burdened or
discriminated against interstate commerce.195 These decisions, the
Court said, had ignored the Necessary and Proper clause and
of isolated individual activity, but must include due regard to the total effect of the attempt-
ed regulation.” (citations omitted)).
189. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
190. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-29.
191. See id. at 119-20.
192. Id. at 120-25.
193. Id. at 119-20.
194. See id. at 120 & n.16 (quoting language from Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936), as exemplifying the rule that Congress had authority to regulate production “only if
by virtue of special circumstances [the activity’s] effects upon interstate commerce were
‘direct’”). It should be noted that any rule with respect to production was simply a subset of
the Court’s approach to intrastate activities more generally, whether intrastate grain storage,
see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130-35 (1876), or intrastate operation of a locomotive, see
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 477, 480-82 (1888).
195. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121.
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instead treated the question as invoking “some concept of sover-
eignty thought to be implicit in the status of statehood.”196 As a
result, the Court claimed, “[c]ertain activities such as ‘production,’
‘manufacturing,’ and ‘mining’ were occasionally said to be within the
province of state governments and beyond the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause.”197 
The Court then instanced the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act as
“[the] first important federal resort to the commerce power” which
“was followed in 1890 by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.”198 These and
other statutes “ushered in new phases of adjudication.”199 Still,
despite the “affirmative” nature of the Sherman Act, “the Court
adhered to its earlier pronouncements, and allowed but little scope
to the power of Congress.”200 E. C. Knight was the chief exemplar of
this era, according to the Court, but not the only one.201 The Court
also instanced Hopkins v. United States and Anderson v. United
States, both decided in 1898.202 These three decisions “played an
important part in several of the five cases in which this Court later
held that Acts of Congress under the Commerce Clause were in
excess of its power.”203 It should be noted that these five cases were
decided between 1908 and 1936, with three of the five decided in
1935 and 1936.204
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1852), and Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S.
1, 20-22 (1888)). The Court did not consider the possibility that such pronouncements simply
implemented a more general principle that intrastate activities of all types, of which pro-
duction and manufacturing were merely a subset, were beyond the power of Congress. See,
e.g., Smith, 124 U.S. at 479-80 (intrastate operation of locomotives); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S.
517, 525-29 (1886) (logs awaiting possible shipment across state lines); Munn, 94 U.S. at 135
(storage of grain not yet identified for interstate shipment); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102
(1876) (intrastate operation of steamships). As explained below, the Court’s pre-New Deal
antitrust jurisprudence applied the direct/indirect test to the more general category of
intrastate conduct, of which production and agriculture were simply a part. See infra notes
298-303 and accompanying text.
198. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 121-22.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 121-22 & n.20.
203. Id. at 122 & n.21 (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)); A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R.,
295 U.S. 330 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Emp’rs’ Liability Cases, 207
U.S. 463 (1908)).
204. See supra note 203 (collecting citations of these decisions).
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After claiming that only five twentieth-century decisions (most
under the influence of E. C. Knight) had employed the direct/
indirect test to limit the reach of congressional power, the Court in
Wickard asserted that other decisions during the very same period
employed an entirely different test.205 More precisely, the Court
said, other decisions had brought “forth broader interpretations of
the Commerce Clause destined to supersede the earlier ones, and to
bring about a return to the principles first enunciated by Chief
Justice Marshall in Gibbons.”206 These decisions supposedly in-
cluded Sherman Act decisions such as Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States, Swift & Co. v. United States, and United
States v. Patten.207 The Court grudgingly conceded that several of
these decisions had invoked and applied the direct/indirect test,
but claimed that these decisions did so merely to “stat[e], rather
than ... reach[ ], a result.”208
The most important decision was the so-called The Shreveport
Rate Case.209 There, the Court sustained the exercise of federal pow-
er to preempt state regulation of intrastate railroad rates that in-
terfered with interstate commerce, specifically, rail transportation
from Louisiana to Texas.210 Wickard characterized the holding in the
decision as allowing federal intervention in
matters having such a close and substantial relation to inter-
state traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to the
security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate service,
and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate
205. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 122-24.
206. Id. at 122.
207. See id. at 122-23 (discussing Swift, 196 U.S. 375 (1904), and citing Standard Oil, 221
U.S. 1 (1911) and Patten, 226 U.S. 525 (1913)).
208. Id. (“In some cases sustaining the exercise of federal power over intrastate matters
the term ‘direct’ was used for the purpose of stating, rather than of reaching, a result.” (citing
United Leather Workers Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 471
(1925))). Herkert, it should be noted, did not sustain the exercise of federal power but instead
held that the challenged restraint merely impacted interstate commerce “indirect[ly].” 265
U.S. at 471-72.
209. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123-24; see also The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342
(1914).
210. See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 350-55.
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commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and without
molestation or hindrance.211
According to Wickard, this language constituted a departure from
the direct/indirect test, insofar as it exemplified “[t]he Court's
recognition of the relevance of the economic effects in the applica-
tion of the Commerce Clause.”212 The Court thus implied that the
direct/indirect formula prevented recognition of such effects in some
cases, thereby thwarting the objective of the commerce power. This
recognition, in turn, “made the mechanical application of legal
formulas no longer feasible.”213 In particular, the acceptance by The
Shreveport Rate Case and other decisions of “an economic measure
of the reach of the power granted to Congress” foreclosed reliance
upon inquiry into whether the regulated activity was “production,”
or whether the economic effects were “indirect.”214
The Court then announced an entirely new test,215 thereby ef-
fectively overruling various decisions that had employed the di-
rect/indirect formulation to determine the reach of the Commerce
Clause. Instead, to determine whether Congress could reach a given
activity, the relevant question was whether the activity “exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce” regardless of
whether such an effect “might at some earlier time have been
defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’”216 Despite its invocation of Gibbons,
the Court did not explain why it was “necessary” that Congress
possess authority over any and all conduct that produced a substan-
tial economic effect on interstate commerce, regardless of whether
that effect gave rise to the possibility that states would adopt
protectionist policies with respect to such conduct.217 Nor did the
Court explain why such authority would not be “inconvenient.”218
Of course, Wickard did not purport to interpret the Sherman Act,
but instead applied a statute passed in 1938 and amended shortly
211. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123 (quoting The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351).
212. Id. at 123-24.
213. Id. at 124.
214. Id. at 124.
215. See id. at 125.
216. See id. (emphasis added).
217. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824) (explaining that federal
authority over intrastate conduct would not be “necessary” and would also be “inconvenient”).
218. Cf. id. at 194.
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thereafter.219 One could thus imagine an alternative jurisprudential
history in which, despite the massive constitutional change in
Wickard, the Court retained the direct/indirect formulation for
purposes of implementing the Sherman Act—subject of course to
congressional revision given the newfound power granted by Wick-
ard. However, just six years after Wickard, in Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., the Court emphatically
rejected the direct/indirect test.220 There, the Court treated the
formulation as an archaic artifact of E. C. Knight and its by-now-
discredited dual federalism.221 The Court embraced Wickard’s
historical account of the evolution of Commerce Clause doctrine,
including the fixation on E. C. Knight and the portrayal of The
Shreveport Rate Case as a major break from E. C. Knight and the
nineteenth century Commerce Clause jurisprudence of which it was
a part.222 Just as the commerce power reached any conduct that
produced a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, so
too did the Sherman Act reach any agreement in restraint of trade
that produced a substantial effect on interstate commerce.223
Subsequent decisions repeatedly applied this substantial effects
test, holding that the Act reaches intrastate conduct that produces
incidental and fortuitous effects on interstate commerce, so long as
they are “substantial.”224
219. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 117 n.10, 128-29.
220. See 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948).
221. See id. at 234.
222. See id. at 230-32 (“We do not stop to review again in detail the familiar story of the
progression of decision to that end, perhaps not told elsewhere more succinctly or pertinently
than in Wickard v. Filburn.”).
223. See id. at 234.
224. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329, 333 (1991) (holding that
the Sherman Act reached a group boycott by physicians in a single hospital that was directed
against a single physician who practiced in a single department); McLain v. Real Estate Bd.
of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 234, 242 (1980) (holding that the Sherman Act reached
horizontal price fixing agreement between realtors in single city); id. at 241 (“The broad
authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause has, of course, long been interpreted to
extend beyond activities actually in interstate commerce to reach other activities that, while
wholly local in nature, nevertheless substantially affect interstate commerce.”); Hosp. Bldg.
Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 739-41 (1976) (holding that the Sherman Act reached
conduct designed to thwart expansion of a single hospital in a single city because the hospital
planning to expand purchased some inputs from out-of-state firms); Goldfarb v. Va. State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778, 793 (1975) (holding that the Sherman Act reached conspiracy between
a single county’s lawyers to fix fees for title searches within the county because some
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V. FLIPPING THE SCRIPT: WHAT WICKARD MIGHT HAVE LEARNED
As detailed above, modern antitrust decisions draw directly upon
Wickard’s substantial effects test when determining the reach of the
Sherman Act vis-à-vis local conduct. These modern antitrust de-
cisions repeatedly apply the Sherman Act to conduct that produces
no interstate harm and thus only an indirect effect on interstate
commerce. The genesis of this body of decisions, Mandeville Island
Farms, embraced various elements of Wickard’s critique of the
direct/indirect test and claimed that the nation’s ever increasing
economic integration and industrial development justified the jet-
tisoning of the direct/indirect test.
But what if, instead, Wickard had followed the lead of Schechter
and Jones & Laughlin Steel and treated the large body of precedent
regarding the reach of the Sherman Act as a source of knowledge
and guidance instead of a source of inconvenient legal authority?
What might Wickard, and by extension Mandeville Island Farms,
have learned from the various antitrust decisions that employed the
direct/indirect test for several decades?
First, recall that Wickard characterized the direct/indirect test as
a formula employed primarily in the context of challenges to state
legislation on the grounds that local legislation nonetheless con-
stituted an impermissible regulation of interstate commerce.225 This
was a common refrain among New Deal-era Justices, seeking to
downplay the precedential importance of the large stock of prece-
dent repeatedly holding that particular conduct or activity was not
interstate commerce.226 Indeed, the Court claimed that only five
post-E. C. Knight decisions had invalidated congressional statutes
as exceeding the scope of the commerce power, a small fraction of
the caselaw that had adjudicated Commerce Clause challenges
purchasers obtained financing from lenders in other states); Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321-
22 (1967) (per curiam) (holding that the Sherman Act reached horizontal agreements between
a single state’s liquor wholesalers to divide markets for retail sales simply because whole-
salers purchased liquor from suppliers in other states).
225. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942).
226. See, e.g., United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 543-44 (1944)
(distinguishing numerous decisions holding that insurance does not constitute interstate
commerce on the grounds that such decisions entailed challenges to state legislation).
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during this period.227 Three such decisions were wedged into a two
year period (1935-36)228 and thus sometimes characterized as ide-
ological reactions to novel New Deal legislation. Thus, the Court
said, the vast majority of decisions employing the direct/indirect
formulation were simply beside the point.229 That small subset of
decisions that had invalidated an affirmative exercise of the com-
merce power, the Court said, were under the undue sway of E. C.
Knight, with its too-narrow conception of Congress’s authority.230
A more careful Court and one more attuned to Sherman Act
jurisprudence would have taken a different tack. To begin with, only
one of the five decisions invoked by Wickard—Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.—even cited E. C. Knight.231 The other four decisions did not.232
More importantly, Wickard’s pronouncement depended upon a ger-
rymandered dataset that artificially minimized the stock of contrary
precedent.233 After all, every Sherman Act decision presenting a
federalism question involved an assertion that the Act reached par-
ticular conduct, often conduct that was entirely intrastate.234 Thus,
each such controversy required the Court to opine about the proper
division between federal and state authority vis-à-vis such conduct.
Moreover, each of these decisions involved application of the direct/
indirect test to resolve this question, quite often against the party
227. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 122 & n.21.
228. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
229. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 122.
230. See id. (“These earlier pronouncements [in E. C. Knight, Hopkins, and Anderson] also
played an important part in several of the five cases in which this Court later held that Acts
of Congress under the Commerce Clause were in excess of its power.”); id. at 122 n.21 (citing
five such cases).
231. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 270.
232. Nor did any of these decisions cite Hopkins or Anderson.
233. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
234. To be sure, most such assertions were by private parties invoking the Sherman Act
in private litigation, as was Mandeville Island Farms for that matter. See, e.g., United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 383-84 (1922). However, this procedural
posture did not alter the fundamental question before the Court in each case, namely,
whether the Commerce Clause authorized the asserted exercise of federal power. Moreover,
the Court employed the same direct/indirect test in cases where the United States was the
plaintiff. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 247-48 (1899)
(rejecting application of the Sherman Act to local conduct as sought by the United States);
Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 591-604 (1898) (same); Anderson v. United States,
171 U.S. 604, 619-20 (1898) (same).
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seeking federal regulation.235 Indeed, during this period, and after
E. C. Knight, the Court refused to apply the Sherman Act to local
conduct at least eight different times over a four decade period,
thereby reaching a result different from that which Wickard’s
substantial effects test and its antitrust progeny would have
generated.236 Moreover, at least as many decisions employed the
direct/indirect test to validate a proposed application of the Act to
challenged conduct.237 As a result, the body of decisions declining to
apply a federal statute to conduct generating a substantial economic
effect was more than double the size that Wickard reported, and
also more evenly distributed as a temporal matter, with most such
decisions arising under the federal statute governing the largest
portion of the nation’s economy, namely, the Sherman Act.238 Thus,
the direct/indirect test would seem to have had a much more robust
pedigree and wider application than Wickard claimed. As such, the
body of law had a greater claim to respect under stare decisis and
was, moreover, a more robust source of information about the actual
implementation of the direct/indirect test than the Wickard Court
seemed to assume.
This brings us to Wickard’s second critique of pre-New Deal
Commerce Clause jurisprudence—one based upon a supposed lack
of fit between actual results and the objective of the Commerce
Clause, particularly as articulated in Gibbons.239 Even large bodies
of precedent are subject to revision if adherence to such decisions
contravenes other important values of the legal system. One such
value, of course, is nonarbitrary decision making—in particular,
ensuring that economically similar conduct is treated the same
235. See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
236. See Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 108 (1933); Indus. Ass’n of S.F.
v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 84 (1925); United Leather Workers’ Int’l Union v. Herkert &
Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 471-72 (1924); Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 413; Blumenstock
Bros. Advert. Agency v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 252 U.S. 436, 444 (1920); Addyston Pipe & Steel,
175 U.S. at 247-48; Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 591-92; Anderson, 171 U.S. at 619-620.
237. See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Ass’n of N. Am., 274
U.S. 37, 46-55 (1927); United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549, 552 (1926); Anderson v.
Shipowners Ass’n of the Pac. Coast, 272 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1926); Coronado Coal, 268 U.S. at
310; United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913)).
238. See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
239. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1942).
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way.240 Wickard, of course, claimed that the direct/indirect test was
“mechanical” and obscured the actual economic impact of local con-
duct, thereby producing results that turned on formalistic distinc-
tions and were inconsistent with the purpose of the Commerce
Clause.241 If true, Wickard’s indictment of the direct/indirect test
could justify repudiating the test and adopting the substantial
effects test instead.
Here again Wickard’s critique was based upon a small and non-
representative subset of the decisions assessing whether local con-
duct that Congress sought to regulate impacted interstate commerce
directly or indirectly. For one thing, the antitrust decisions at least
were in no way “mechanical,” “artificial,” cryptic, or otherwise in-
sensitive to the actual economic effects of the conduct potentially
subject to regulation.242 Nor did these decisions simply employ “di-
rect” or “indirect” as labels to announce results determined by other
(unspecified) means, as Wickard claimed, thereby reaching results
inconsistent with the objective of the Commerce Clause.243 On the
240. See Con’t T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977) (concluding that one
of two doctrinal categories that treated economically identical conduct differently must be
abandoned, despite stare decisis); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. 504
U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) (“Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than
actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law.”).
241. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123-24.
242. Cf. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 230 (1948)
(referring to E. C. Knight “and succeeding [unnamed] decisions embracing the same
artificially drawn lines” that supposedly “produced a series of consequences for the exercise
of national power over industry conducted on a national scale which the evolving nature of
our industrialism foredoomed to reversal”).
243. It should be noted that, so far as this author is aware, no scholar or jurist has ar-
ticulated a defensible alternative methodology or principle that animated the implementation
of the direct/indirect test during this period. While some have asserted that the Court was
sympathetic to big business and unsympathetic to labor, the Court’s application of the
direct/indirect formulation often led to rejection of suits brought by businesses beset by suc-
cessful union conspiracies to restrain trade and shut down plaintiff’s businesses. See, e.g.,
United Leather Workers’ Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 571 (1924);
Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 559, 567-69
(1997) (instancing Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., Coronado Coal, and Levering & Garrigues Co.
as decisions in which the Court’s more “conservative” members rejected application of the
Sherman Act to labor union conspiracies that injured private business because such ap-
plication exceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause). Moreover, in Anderson v. Shipowners
Ass’n of the Pac. Coast, 272 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1926), the Court found that the Sherman Act
reached a horizontal agreement setting wages and other working conditions of seamen op-
erating vessels on interstate voyages, thereby applying the Act to business interests at the
behest of a labor union.
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contrary, each such decision reflected a fact-intensive effort to
determine the real, one might say “actual,” impact of the conduct in
question.244 Often this analysis entailed explicit or implicit assess-
ment of the relevant market and the defendants’ market shares, of
the sort sometimes employed to assess whether the agreement was
in fact “in restraint of trade” in the first place.245 In each case, the
Court sought to determine whether the restraint of trade itself
visited harms on citizens in other states or, instead, merely
produced harms that were confined to a single state. The results
seem to reflect a successful effort in this regard. Thus, decisions
such as United States v. Patten,246 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey
v. United States,247 and United States v. American Tobacco Co.248 all
found that the Act applied to intrastate conduct such as mergers
and the purchase of property, given the apparent harmful impact of
such conduct on citizens in more than one state. Decisions such as
244. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120 (“[N]omenclature such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’
foreclos[ed] consideration of the actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate
commerce” (emphasis added)).
245. Cf. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239-41 (1918) (finding restraint
imposed by the Chicago Board of Trade to be reasonable in part because putative victims of
the restraint, grain dealers in neighboring states, could sell their grain on other exchanges
in the midwest).
246. 226 U.S. 525, 542 (1913) (explaining that cotton was a product of the “Southern states”
and that most cotton moved in interstate commerce and was thus “obtained from time to time
by ... manufacturers of cotton fabrics in the Northern States”); id. at 538-39 (recounting the
allegation that, as a result of defendants’ conspiracy “an abnormal demand was to be created
on the part of such sellers [on the New York Exchange] who would pay excessive prices to
obtain cotton for delivery upon their contracts” and that “[t]he excessive prices prevailing
upon the New York Exchange would cause similar prices to exist upon other cotton markets”);
id. at 542-43 (finding that defendants’ conspiracy, if successful, would “corner” the market for
cotton sold on the New York Cotton Exchange and necessarily raise the price of cotton trading
in other markets as well, thereby “it would directly and materially impede and burden the due
course of trade and commerce among the States and therefore inflict upon the public the
injuries which the Anti-trust Act is designed to prevent”).
247. 221 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1911) (finding that the defendant employed various challenged
practices, including mergers and intrastate pricing, to obtain a monopoly over items man-
ufactured and sold in interstate commerce).
248. 221 U.S. 106, 183-84 (1911).
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Coronado Coal,249 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,250 In-
dustrial Ass’n of San Francisco v. United States,251 and others found
that any harmful effects of the challenged intrastate conduct were
confined to a single state where the challenged conduct took place.252
In short, the Court appeared to employ the direct/indirect test so as
to allocate to the national government only those activities produc-
ing interstate harms, harms that rendered federal authority nec-
essary because only Congress had the sort of “enlarged view of the
interests of all the States”253 necessary to inform such regulation,
thereby leaving states with exclusive authority over that conduct
over which, according to Gibbons, federal authority would be “in-
convenient.”254
Moreover, it should be clear by now that these decisions were not
unthinking applications of some inflexible and frozen-in-time rule,
such as an outmoded distinction between production and manufac-
turing on the one hand, and trading and transportation (the latter
two both forms of “commerce”) on the other, impervious to accommo-
dation because of changing national circumstances.255 Nor did these
decisions or the standard they invoked in any way hamper or
undermine appropriate antitrust regulation in the twentieth cen-
tury’s rapidly changing economy.256 As a flexible standard, like the
249. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 412 (1922)
(finding that the plaintiff’s mine that was shut down by violent union conspiracy produced a
minuscule share of the region’s and nation’s coal with the result that the conspiracy would
“have no appreciable effect upon the price of coal or non-union competition,” such that the
defendants did not intend to impact the interstate price of coal).
250. 175 U.S. 211, 247-48 (1899) (finding that the commerce power and the Sherman Act
did not reach "defendants as might reside and carry on business in the same State where the
pipe provided for in any particular contract was to be delivered" because "the sale, trans-
portation and delivery of the pipe by them under that contract would be a transaction wholly
within the state, and the statute would not be applicable to them in that case"); id. at 248
(modifying the decree so as not to reach intrastate portion of the conspiracy).
251. 268 U.S. 64, 82 (1925).
252. Of course, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. also held that the Act did apply to agreements
setting unreasonable prices for actual interstate transactions. See 175 U.S. at 235-37.
253. See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).
254. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).
255. Cf. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 233 (1948)
(characterizing pre-New Deal precedents in this manner).
256. Cf. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980) (“During the
near century of Sherman Act experience, forms and modes of business and commerce have
changed along with changes in communication and travel, and innovations in methods of
conducting particular businesses have altered relationships in commerce. Application of the
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Sherman Act’s Rule of Reason itself, the direct/indirect test was
sensitive to changed circumstances, both legal and factual, that
might bear upon whether the impact of a practice was, in fact, direct
or indirect. Indeed, responding to the claim that application of a
fact-intensive rule of reason was inconsistent with the judicial role,
the Standard Oil Court invoked caselaw that evaluated whether an
otherwise valid enactment was in fact invalid because of its “direct
effect upon interstate commerce.”257 As a result, a practice that
purportedly produced (or was perceived to produce) merely an
indirect effect on interstate commerce in the late nineteenth century
could be deemed to produce a direct effect forty years later. Thus,
like the Rule of Reason itself, the direct/indirect standard contained
dynamic potential and was thus fully capable of accommodating
significant changes in the nation’s economic circumstances and/or
legal institutions that might impact whether particular conduct or
activity was properly subject to state or national regulation.258
To be sure, the results of the direct/indirect test allocated to the
states exclusive regulatory authority over a significant portion of
the nation’s economic activities. With respect to such restraints,
then, an institutional framework of competitive federalism gener-
ated the (state-by-state) rules governing alleged trade restraints, in
Act reflects an adaptation to these changing circumstances.” (emphasis added)); id. (concluding
that the Sherman Act “reach[es] other activities that, while wholly local in nature, never-
theless substantially affect interstate commerce”); Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 230
(contending that “the evolving nature of our industrialism foredoomed to reversal” pre-
Wickard antitrust federalism jurisprudence).
257. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 70 (1911) (“Consider the power
which must be exercised in every case where the courts are called upon to determine whether
particular acts are invalid which are, abstractly speaking, in and of themselves valid, but
which are asserted to be invalid because of their direct effect upon interstate commerce.”).
258. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1988) (“The term
‘restraint of trade’ in the statute, like the term at common law, refers not to a particular list
of agreements, but to a particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite
different sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances. The changing content of the
term ‘restraint of trade’ was well recognized at the time the Sherman Act was enacted.... The
Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential. It invokes
the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned
to the term in 1890.” (emphasis added)); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the
Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 91-92 (explaining that logic and rationale of Standard
Oil’s rule of reason requires courts to “translate” public policy of the statute in light of
evolving economic theory that informs courts’ understanding of the impact of challenged
restraints).
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the same way that competitive federalism designs the rules of cor-
porate law today.259 Most, if not all, of these intrastate activities
produced “substantial effects” on interstate commerce as the Su-
preme Court has understood that term for the past several de-
cades.260 Still, this Author is aware of no evidence that national
authority over such restraints was “necessary” within the meaning
of Gibbons, that is, that states were incapable of interdicting ac-
tivity that produced harm confined to their jurisdiction if they so
chose.261
Indeed, during the early part of the twentieth century, some
states levelled greater aggregate penalties on antitrust offenders
than did the United States.262 Of course, states were entirely free to
adopt different normative policies vis-à-vis such intrastate activity
from those the United States pursued vis-à-vis interstate commerce,
and some states did.263 Nonetheless, or perhaps even because of such
259. See Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 174, at 448 (“The sole concern for Sherman Act
jurisdiction under [competitive federalism] is whether the defendants' conduct in one state
creates market power that spills across state lines in the form of higher prices. For those
trade restraints whose price effects are confined to the defendants' home state, that state's
antitrust regulators have sufficient incentive and resources to adequately address the prob-
lem. Political competition between states will result in optimal, though not necessarily uni-
form, antitrust policy with due regard for experimentation to address novel business practices
tailored to local conditions.”); Alan J. Meese, Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism and
Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competition Between The
States?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 78-87 (1999) (contending that competition between
the states will generate efficient background rules governing franchise relationships thereby
obviating the need for federal antitrust scrutiny of alleged opportunism).
260. Cf. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 744 (1976) (finding that the
Sherman Act reached an alleged effort to block expansion of a single hospital because such
expansion would increase “purchases of out-of-state medicines and supplies,” “revenues from
out-of-state insurance companies,” and also “management fees that petitioner pays to its out-
of-state parent corporation”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784-85 (1975) (finding
that the Sherman Act reached an agreement setting title search fees in single county because
some undetermined number of purchasers were moving in from other states).
261. See James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The
Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
495, 497-507 (1987) (describing state antitrust regulation of intrastate restraints during this
period).
262. See id. at 501-02 (reporting that Texas, for instance, levied a larger magnitude of
antitrust fines than the United States between 1890 and 1925, and that Missouri levied
nearly the same amount in fines as the United States).
263. For instance, in the early 1930s, several states adopted legislation that immunized
intrastate minimum resale price fixing agreements from attack under state antitrust laws.
See, e.g., Ewald T. Grether, Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting
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regulatory diversity,264 the economy, according to some studies any-
way, operated at an extremely high rate of efficiency during this
period, with the maximum social loss resulting from a misallocation
of resources standing at about 0.1 percent of the nation’s gross do-
mestic product.265 At least some of this misallocation was apparently
due to lax federal enforcement of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.266
In short, the direct/indirect formulation and the principle it
implemented were both entirely capable of the sort of evolutionary
dynamism necessary to ensure a proper allocation of regulatory
authority over potentially anticompetitive conduct between states
Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 640, 640 n.2 (1936) (reporting that, as of 1935, nine other
states, in addition to California, representing 40 percent of the nation’s population, had
adopted fair trade legislation); see also Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 453-57 (1927)
(evaluating Colorado antitrust statute that allowed cartelists to assert a reasonable price
defense); cf. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400 (1911) (banning
minimum resale price maintenance under Section 1 of the Sherman Act). While in Cline the
Court invalidated the reasonable price defense as void for vagueness under the due process
clause, it did not doubt that Colorado had exclusive jurisdiction over the agreements governed
by the statute. See 274 U.S. at 453-57.
264. Many states adopted legislation during the 1930s that immunized intrastate
minimum resale price maintenance in industries characterized by significant interbrand
competition. See Grether, supra note 263, at 640 n.2. Congress recognized these efforts in the
1937 Miller-Tydings Act, which allowed states to provide such immunity to agreements in
interstate commerce and otherwise subject to the Sherman Act. See Pub. L. No. 75-314, 50
Stat. 693 (1937). At one time, forty-six of the nation’s then forty-eight states were such “Fair
Trade” states. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 9 (1975). It
turns out that these states were right to reject the Supreme Court’s (national) hostility to
such agreements, given that these agreements usually produced no harm or increased
welfare. See Alan J. Meese, Assorted Anti-Leegin Canards: Why Resistance is Misguided and
Futile, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 907, 936 (2013); see also D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation
of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, The Rule of Reason, and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1003, 1007 (2013).
265. See Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 77,
84 (1954) (“Thus we come to our final conclusion. Elimination of resource misallocations in
American manufacturing in the late twenties would bring with it an improvement in
consumer welfare of just a little more than a tenth of a per cent. In present values [that is, in
1954 dollars], this welfare gain would amount to about $2.00 per capita.”); see also David
Schwartzman, The Burden of Monopoly, 68 J. POL. ECON. 627, 630 (1960) (reaching a nearly
identical result as Harberger).
266. Thus, during the period studied by Professor Harberger (1924-1928), the Department
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission relaxed enforcement policies vis-à-vis horizontal
practices adopted by trade associations. See ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 57-65 (1993) (discussing relaxation of such enforcement
efforts from 1925-1928 in the form of comfort letters which the Department provided to
important trade associations (approving collusive facilitating practices), and in the form of
FTC “trade practice conferences” (adopting “codes of fair practice”)).
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and the national government, thereby implementing the objective
of the Commerce Clause. Had Wickard better appreciated the
Sherman Act federalism caselaw in general, and the ins and outs of
the direct/indirect test in particular, it would have understood that
the substantial effects test added no value in this respect and
instead conferred upon Congress authority that was “unnecessary”
and “inconvenient.”267
But Wickard leveled a third critique as well. That is, even if
internally coherent in the Sherman Act context, and even if
consistent with certain other decisions, such as Schechter, the
antitrust decisions could still contradict a parallel set of decisions
determining the scope of the commerce power in other contexts,
thereby leaving Congress, the states, and private parties potentially
subject to legislation by both sovereigns, to speculate about which
set of standards would govern a new category of legislation. If
Commerce Clause doctrine did in fact consist of two coexisting sets
of standards, a responsible Supreme Court would eventually be
forced to choose one over the other, so that a unified standard gov-
erned all assessments of the scope of congressional authority over
commerce.
Both Wickard and Mandeville Island Farms claimed that the
antitrust cases and other decisions, which applied the direct/indirect
distinction in a manner that limited Congress’s power, coexisted
with a parallel set of decisions.268 Most notably, The Shreveport Rate
Case and its progeny, it is said, consistently took a more expansive
approach to congressional authority and consistently validated the
exercise of congressional power, unlike the other line of decisions,
which continued to find their inspiration in E. C. Knight.269 If this
is so, then respect for the rule of law at least required the rejection
of one such standard and application of the other to all Commerce
Clause questions. No doubt the Wickard Court believed it was doing
exactly that, and Mandeville Island Farms simply parroted
Wickard’s reasoning.
267. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).
268. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123 (1942); see also Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 231 (1948).
269. See supra notes 200-22 and accompanying text.
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Here again, Wickard and Mandeville Island Farms were simply
wrong about the caselaw they inherited. The antitrust federalism
precedents did not constitute a retrograde throwback to decisions
such as E. C. Knight—throwbacks that somehow coexisted with
purportedly more reasonable decisions, such as The Shreveport Rate
Case—until Wickard and then Mandeville Island Farms finally
excised the old growth and set things right.270 The Court’s pre-New
Deal antitrust federalism decisions rarely cited E. C. Knight, and
then only for the purpose of distinguishing or narrowing the
decision so as to allow the Sherman Act to reach intrastate transac-
tions that led to interstate harm.271 Moreover, the Court also
reached decisions inconsistent with E. C. Knight, albeit without
expressly distinguishing the decision, by applying the Act to
activities seemingly beyond the scope of E. C. Knight’s rule.272
Put another way, the Court’s antitrust federalism jurisprudence
and its adherence to the direct/indirect formulation did not, contrary
to Wickard’s apparent assumption, require the Court to carry the
baggage of E. C. Knight, preclude understanding of actual economic
effects of conduct Congress sought to regulate, or prevent the na-
tional government from exercising a necessary power over conduct
states could not be trusted to regulate. On the contrary, the Court
repeatedly sustained the exercise of federal power vis-à-vis chal-
lenged restraints that produced harm exceeding the boundaries of
a particular state.273
270. See Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 231-33 (characterizing The Shreveport Rate
Case as announcing a more expansive approach to the commerce power not reflected in
antitrust decisions); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123-24.
271. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68-69 (rejecting defendants’
argument that E. C. Knight precluded application of the Sherman Act to mergers and other
intrastate conduct that produced a monopoly); see also United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106, 183-84 (1911) (rejecting defendants’ argument that the challenged combination was
“merely [a] matter[ ] of intrastate commerce and therefore subject alone to state control”);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 238-40 (1899) (distinguishing E. C.
Knight).
272. See Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925)
(finding that the Sherman Act applied to apparently intrastate conduct because the
defendants possessed the requisite intent to restrain interstate commerce); United States v.
Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 540-44 (1913) (finding that the Act reached a conspiracy to “corner” the
New York market for cotton because such intrastate activity would induce interstate price
increases).
273. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
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Nor did the Court’s antitrust federalism jurisprudence somehow
preclude or contradict decisions such as The Shreveport Rate Case.
On the contrary, The Shreveport Rate Case, authored by the same
Justice Hughes that would later author Schechter and invoke the
antitrust federalism decisions with approval, appears to have been
a straightforward application of the antiprotectionism principle that
informed the Court’s pre-1890 jurisprudence and drove application
of the direct/indirect formulation.274 Justice Hughes began The
Shreveport Rate Case opinion by repeating the rationale for the
adoption of the Commerce Clause articulated by the Court’s pre-
1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence, citing Gibbons and three
other pre-1890 decisions:
Interstate trade was not left to be destroyed or impeded by the
rivalries of local governments. The purpose was to make
impossible the recurrence of the evils which had overwhelmed
the Confederation and to provide the necessary basis of national
unity by insuring “uniformity of regulation against conflicting
and discriminating state legislation.” By virtue of the compre-
hensive terms of the grant, the authority of Congress is at all
times adequate to meet the varying exigencies that arise and to
protect the national interest by securing the freedom of inter-
state commercial intercourse from local control.275
The power to regulate such commerce, the Court said, included the
power to “to provide the law for the government of interstate
commerce.”276 This power, in turn, included the authority to govern
intrastate activities if such activities “molest[ed],” “hind[ered],”
“retard[ed],” “cripple[d],” “destroy[ed]” or “injur[ed]” interstate
commerce.277 The state regulation of intrastate railway rates had
274. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
275. The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1914) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196, 224 (1822); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 446 (1827); County of
Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 696-97 (1881); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888);
Second Emprs’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 24, 53 (1912); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S.
352, 398, 399 (1913)).
276. Id. at 351.
277. See id. at 353 (invoking prior cases as holding that the Commerce Clause included
power to “prevent the common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial
intercourse from being used in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate commerce”
(emphasis added)); id. at 354 (“The use of the instrument of interstate commerce in a
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done exactly that, setting intrastate rates for carriage between
Dallas and Galveston, for instance, which were far lower than rates
for interstate carriage between Dallas and Shreveport, Louisiana,
which the Interstate Commerce Commission had approved as rea-
sonable.278 These artificially low intrastate rates disadvantaged and
injured commerce between Shreveport and other states, to the
advantage of Texas ports and Texas enterprises.279
The state’s regulation of intrastate rates, the Court said, created
conditions in which “one person or locality is unduly favored as
against another under substantially similar conditions of traffic.”280
That this result was “an evil,” the Court said, “is undeniable.”281
Moreover, Congress’s authority to correct the evil was “equally
clear,” given that the “evil consists in the action of an interstate
carrier in unreasonably discriminating against interstate traffic
over its line.”282 The Court added that “[t]he use of the instrument
of interstate commerce in a discriminatory manner so as to inflict
injury upon that commerce, or some part thereof, furnishes
abundant ground for Federal intervention.”283 The power to deal
with the relation between intrastate and interstate rates lay
“exclusively with Congress.”284 A state’s attempt to do so “directly
discriminatory manner so as to inflict injury upon that commerce, or some part thereof,
furnishes abundant ground for Federal intervention.” (emphasis added)).
278. See id. at 346. For instance, “[t]he first class rate from Houston to Lufkin, Texas, 118.2
miles, was 50 cents per 100 pounds, while the rate from Shreveport to the same point, 112.5
miles, was 69 cents.” Id. Both Houston and Shreveport were ports, with the result that the
artificially low intrastate rates advantaged Texas ports and business when compared to
Shreveport and businesses in other states. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in
the Guilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1069 (1988) (“But
the Texas Railroad Commission, which set Texas rates, followed its own policy of encouraging
the economic growth of Texas cities. It attempted to compensate for the low interstate rates
accorded to Shreveport by making rates within Texas much lower than the interstate rates
from Shreveport to the same Texas points.” (citations omitted)).
279. See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 354 (“The use of the instrument of
interstate commerce in a discriminatory manner so as to inflict injury upon that commerce,
or some part thereof, furnishes abundant ground for Federal intervention.”); Hovenkamp,
supra note 278, at 1069 (“The effect of this scheme was to give Houston and Dallas an
advantage over Shreveport with respect to shipments originating in or destined for other
Texas points.”).
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interfer[ed] with [interstate rates],” unless the state simply copied
the interstate rate set by federal authorities—something Texas had
refused to do.285 At least one previous decision had invalidated state
rate regulation for this very reason, on the grounds that the
interstate rate “was directly controlled by state law.”286 Thus,
Congress had ample authority to preempt the Texas rates.
It should be obvious that The Shreveport Rate Case in no way
presaged Wickard or its substantial economic effects test, at least as
that test has played out in Mandeville Island Farms and its
progeny. On the contrary, both in principle and application, The
Shreveport Rate Case seems to have had far more in common with
the Court’s early twentieth century antitrust federalism caselaw.287
After all, The Shreveport Rate Case began by invoking the same
principle—avoiding interstate protectionist legislation that pro-
duced interstate spillovers—that drove application of the di-
rect/indirect distinction in antitrust and other contexts.288 Moreover,
the Court applied this principle to the facts before it in a straightfor-
ward manner, explaining how the preempted state regulations
advantaged local industry by forcing interstate carriers to charge
rates that discriminated against interstate commerce.289
This, of course, was the very sort of partial and discriminating
legislation that harmed consumers in more than one state that pre-
1890 decisions identified as the paradigmatic targets of the com-
merce power.290 Even before passage of the Sherman Act, the Court
had invoked similar reasoning to invalidate state regulation of
intrastate railroad rates—even absent Congressional action—on the
grounds that only Congress, as representative of all the states, was
competent to regulate such rates, so as to avoid the results of
possibly parochial legislation.291 Less than a decade after passage of
285. Id. (“It is manifest that the State cannot fix the relation of the carrier’s interstate and
intrastate charges without directly interfering with the former, unless it simply follows the
standard set by Federal authority.”).
286. See id. at 354-55 (quoting The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 429 (1913)).
287. See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 114-56 and accompanying text.
289. See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 346.
290. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
291. See Wabash & St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 570-72 (1886); see also
Hovenkamp, supra note 278, at 1063-64 (describing the Wabash Court’s concern that state
regulation of the intrastate portion of an interstate rail trip would burden interstate
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the Sherman Act, the Court embraced the same rationale when
holding that Congress necessarily possessed the authority to ban
private agreements that directly burdened interstate commerce.292
Moreover, The Shreveport Rate Case Court in no way suggested that
Congress had the authority to preempt state legislation simply
because an enactment produced any economic effect on interstate
commerce that a court might deem “substantial.”293 Instead, the
existence of “a close and substantial relation” between the intrastate
activity regulated and interstate commerce was merely a necessary
condition for congressional authority.294 Thus, The Shreveport Rate
Case Court sustained the exercise of congressional authority be-
cause, in addition, the challenged enactment produced an “evil” in
the form of “discrimination” and thus an “injury” to interstate
commerce, thereby empowering Congress to prevent conduct that
“hind[ered]” or “retard[ed]” commerce.295 Failure to recognize this
power of preemption would allow states such as Texas to “directly
control[ ]” the rates for interstate transportation and thus regulate
interstate commerce, contrary to the rationale for adopting the
Commerce Clause.296 An indirect economic effect, unrelated to any
economic harm, did not suffice to confer authority on Congress to
regulate purely local activity.297
All in all, then, the Court’s antitrust federalism jurisprudence
was entirely consistent with decisions such as The Shreveport Rate
Case, both in principle and execution. Thus, the pre-New Deal
embrace and implementation of the direct/indirect test was far
more widespread and consistent than the Wickard Court let on. A
commerce); id. at 1059 (explaining that the potential for abuse, particularly for “freeriding by
the states,” was “substantial,” and that “federal control by either legislation or judicial
intervention was clearly necessary”).
292. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 230-31 (1899)
(explaining that Congress possessed exclusive authority over private agreements that directly
burdened interstate commerce because each state would regulate such agreements in its “own
particular interest”); see also Alan J. Meese, State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An
Essay for Professor Hovenkamp, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2161, 2176-78 (2015) (explaining Addyston
Pipe’s holding that Congress has exclusive authority over private agreements directly
restraining interstate commerce).
293. See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 355.
294. See id. at 351.
295. Id. at 351-55.
296. See id. at 354-55.
297. See id. at 355.
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contrary conclusion would impute a surprising amount of judicial
inconsistency to the author of The Shreveport Rate Case, then-
Justice Hughes.298 It was Hughes, after all, who would later author
both Schechter and Jones & Laughlin Steel.299 Both decisions
invoked the direct/indirect distinction in general and the Sherman
Act manifestation of this formulation in particular with approval.300
Both also cited the The Shreveport Rate Case as a proper exemplar
of the scope of the commerce power within the same overall
framework that generated the direct/indirect test.301 Both described
The Shreveport Rate Case as authorizing congressional regulation
when necessary to ensure “freedom of interstate traffic from
interference or unjust discrimination and to promote efficiency.”302
In short, as of 1940, The Shreveport Rate Case, Schechter, Jones
& Laughlin Steel and the numerous antitrust decisions discussed
earlier were all part of a unified, mainstream body of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that employed the direct/indirect test so as to
distinguish conduct properly susceptible to state regulation from
that which Congress alone was competent to regulate, with the
298. See id. at 345.
299. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 22 (1937); A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 519 (1935).
300. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
301. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 38; Schecter, 295 U.S. at 544.
302. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37-38 (“That intrastate activities, by reason
of close and intimate relation to interstate commerce, may fall within federal control is
demonstrated in the case of carriers who are engaged in both interstate and intrastate
transportation. There federal control has been found essential to secure the freedom of
interstate traffic from interference or unjust discrimination and to promote the efficiency of
the interstate service.” (citing The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351-52)); Schechter, 295
U.S. at 544 (“We have held that, in dealing with common carriers engaged in both interstate
and intrastate commerce, the dominant authority of Congress necessarily embraces the right
to control their intrastate operations in all matters having such a close and substantial
relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to secure the freedom
of that traffic from interference or unjust discrimination and to promote the efficiency of the
interstate service.” (citing The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351-52)); see also Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 328-29 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (“A survey of the cases
shows that the words have been interpreted with suppleness of adaptation and flexibility of
meaning. The power is as broad as the need that evokes it. One of the most common and
typical instances of a relation characterized as direct has been that between interstate and
intrastate rates for carriers by rail where the local rates are so low as to divert business
unreasonably from interstate competitors. In such circumstances Congress has the power to
protect the business of its carriers against disintegrating encroachments.” (citing The
Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351-52)).
2019] WICKARD THROUGH AN ANTITRUST LENS 1391
result that the application of federal power was “necessary” within
the meaning of Gibbons.303 While some conduct that produced a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce also directly
impacted interstate commerce, thereby justifying the exercise of
federal authority, other such conduct merely impacted interstate
commerce indirectly, no matter how substantial the effect. And, as
the Court explained in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the magnitude of
the effect did not control the outcome of the direct/indirect test.304
Instead, the nature of the effect controlled.305 Thus, Wickard was the
outlier: its substantial effects test (including as applied in the
modern antitrust context) was a radical break with both the prin-
ciple and execution of pre-New Deal Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence—The Shreveport Rate Case included—and the principle on
which such jurisprudence rested.
VI. A PARTIAL REHABILITATION OF WICKARD
Consideration of the Court's antitrust federalism decisions re-
veals that Wickard's critique of pre-Wickard Commerce Clause
jurisprudence rests upon a distorted and misleading account of
numerous decisions employing the direct/indirect test when deter-
mining whether the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to reach
local conduct. A proper understanding of the Court’s antitrust de-
cisions would have undermined various assumptions that drove
Wickard’s rejection of the direct/indirect formulation in favor of the
substantial effects test, a rationale and result that the Court would
mimic in Mandeville Island Farms a few years later.306
At the same time, and somewhat ironically, these same decisions
provide a more defensible foundation for the result in Wickard itself,
albeit not the substantial effects test as such. Recall that the statute
before the Court in Wickard sought to regulate the price of grain, a
commodity traded across state lines for prices obtained in a national
market.307 More precisely, the statute sought to ensure so-called
303. See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
304. See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 307-08.
305. See id. at 307-08.
306. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234-35
(1948).
307. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1942).
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“parity prices” for various agricultural commodities, so as to ensure
farmers a reasonable profit.308 There was no doubt that Congress
possessed the authority to regulate the price of interstate grain
transactions or, for instance, prevent rival sellers from fixing the
price of interstate grain sales.309 However, such regulations cannot
change the laws of supply and demand; and dictating a high price
could conceivably induce farmers to plant more grain than they
would otherwise plant, thereby producing a surplus of grain, eco-
nomic waste, and probable circumvention of the federally deter-
mined price. Of course, individual states would be free to regulate
grain production within their borders, thereby mitigating such
concerns.310 However, given the valid national objective of maintain-
ing super-competitive prices in the national market, and given that
most grain produced in a given state is likely exported to others, no
individual state would fully internalize the price-increasing or price-
reducing impact of its regulatory decisions vis-à-vis the production
of grain within its own borders.311 Thus, each state would rationally
free ride on the hoped-for regulatory decisions of others,312 in the
same way that individual cartel members might free ride upon
308. See Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 52 stat. 31 (1938); see also
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115-16 (describing statutory scheme and objectives).
309. See, e.g., Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1922) (invalidating state
regulation of the price of grain exported to other states); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. 211, 227-28, 234-35 (1899) (holding that the Sherman Act properly reaches
horizontal agreement setting unreasonable prices for interstate sales); Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 135 (1876) (holding that states may regulate the price of storing grain that may
later be shipped in interstate commerce “until Congress acts in reference to their inter-state
relations”); see also Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 319-20 (Hughes, C.J., concurring) (concluding
that the commerce power includes the authority to regulate the price of interstate sales
subject only to due process protections).
310. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1888) (sustaining the state’s authority to ban
the production of alcohol within its borders); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1876)
(sustaining the exclusion of non-Virginians from planting oysters in state stream because
states possessed exclusive authority over agricultural production).
311. Of course, before 1934, outright regulation of grain prices could have run afoul of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La.,
278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 354-55 (1928); Tyson & Bro. v.
Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 428 (1927). Compare Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 538-39 (1934)
(sustaining state authority to regulate milk prices against Fourteenth Amendment due
process challenge), with Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 319 (Hughes, C.J., concurring) (“We are not
at liberty to deny to the Congress, with respect to interstate commerce, a power
commensurate with that enjoyed by the States in the regulation of their internal commerce.”).
312. See Hovenkamp, supra note 278, at 1059.
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hoped-for output reductions and price increases by others.313 Thus,
the production of wheat, while an intrastate activity, was one of
those “internal concerns which affect the States generally.”314 As a
result, only Congress, with its “enlarged view of the interests of all
the States” is competent to regulate such production.315 Thus,
Wickard did not have to discard the direct/indirect test in order to
sustain the regulation before it.316
This is not to say that the direct/indirect test, properly imple-
mented, will always achieve the same results as the modern
substantial effects test implemented by Wickard’s progeny, includ-
ing under the Sherman Act. Instead, the two tests will only achieve
the same results when the nature of the substantial economic effect
is such that states lack appropriate incentives to regulate the
underlying conduct producing the effect. When, on the other hand,
the effect conveys no such implication, for instance, if the harm from
the restraint (as opposed to an incidental effect) is confined to a
single state, the interstate impact will be deemed indirect, even if
the effect would be deemed substantial under Wickard and its
progeny.317 Recognizing federal authority over such agreements
merely because they produce a substantial indirect effect on inter-
state commerce would be, in the words of John Marshall, “unneces-
sary.”318
313. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 94-96 (1971).
314. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824). Of course, this result
depends upon adoption of the aggregation approach that Wickard also employed. Such an
innovation, if it was an innovation, was necessary to sustain federal authority under either
the direct/indirect test or the substantial effects test.
315. See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).
316. Cf. Filburn v. Helke, 43 F. Supp. 1017, 1022-23 (S.D. Ohio 1942) (Allen, J., dissenting)
(finding that the impact of the regulated party’s conduct was direct when aggregated with
other conduct of the same type).
317. See Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 174, at 448 (explaining that states possess proper
incentives to regulate cartels and other unreasonable restraints that produce harms confined
to a single state). 
318. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
